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EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK’S REACTIONS TO THE 
RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS WITHIN THE TWO-PILLAR FRAMEWORK 
 
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate whether the European Central Bank has been 
consistent in its monetary policy approach during the recent extraordinary financial 
conditions. The evaluation is conducted within the ECB’s two-pillar framework. Both the 
central banks’ interest rate setting behaviour and their liquidity providing actions have been 
studied. The effectiveness of all these actions has been mostly left outside this paper’s focus. 
 
The European Central Bank’s policy framework is based on the two-pillar framework, which 
includes very thorough monetary and economic analysis. Cross-checking the results from the 
analysis the ECB should maintain price stability in the euro area. This current study shows 
that the integration process still underway in the euro area limits the ECB’s pro-activity 
regarding extraordinary situations, as seen during the recent financial crisis. 
 
The criticism laid on the ECB’s actions is found to be partly justified in a context of the 
interest rate setting, while the liquidity providing actions have closely followed those 
conducted by other major central banks. The interest rate level lowering has been relatively 
slow in the euro area, especially when compared to the US. This is found to result mostly 
from the consistency of the ECB’s policy, as well as misperceptions and forecast errors 
toward the evolution of the recent turmoil.   
 
Empirical tests, which are loosely based on an earlier study by Gerlach (2004), further provide 
support to the consistency in the ECB’s actions. They also show that since the ECB has still 
reacted to changes in real economic variables, it is likely that since the recent changes have 
happened extraordinarily fast, the models used have not been able to efficiently predict the 
future outcomes. 
 
Overall, the most significant limitations for the ECB’s policy framework, as well as for its 
flexibility and pro-activity in exceptional situations come through the disintegrated euro area. 
This makes the ECB’s responsibilities much less straight forward than those of a central bank 
acting within a single nation state.     
 
 
Keywords: The European Central Bank (the ECB), economic analysis, monetary analysis, 
financial crisis, the refinancing interest rate. 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Motivation  
 
The global economy has been hit by its most severe financial turmoil, at least since the Great 
Depression in the 1930s. In the autumn of 2008 dramatic weakening of the global financial 
industry, topped by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, led to a sudden disappearance of 
liquidity in the markets. Investors were unable to evaluate the credit worthiness of their 
counterparties or the value of extremely complex financial instruments. The values of these 
instruments created in order to provide liquidity from sources outside normal deposit 
institutions backed by the central banks. The warnings over the high credit expansion seen in 
several years, especially in the US economy, had been left unnoticed, and furthermore, both 
the European Central Bank (the ECB) and the Federal Reserve (the Fed) had maintained a low 
level of interest rates, thus supporting economic growth. Suddenly, the bubble blew up and 
faith was again placed in the central banks to maintain liquidity in the market in order to save 
the collapsing global financial system. 
 
The European Central Bank has received numerous critical comments and evaluations from 
politicians, market participants and academics over monetary policy choices in Europe. 
Without question some of this criticism comes from good and reasonable reasons. It is widely 
accepted that the ECB, as well as most other institutions, failed in evaluating and estimating 
the strength and suddenness of the global financial crisis, which began in 2007. The ECB has 
been accused of acting too slowly, and with not enough power, thus enabling the US born 
crisis to spread across Europe with a tremendous pace and resulted in remarkable 
consequences in the economy of the area. The ECB has not even decreased the level of its 
main refinancing interest rate to zero, as the Fed has. Furthermore the explanations for this 
view have been more or less convincing. In December 2008, the ECB executive board 
member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi stated that the situation in Europe was “very different” from the 
US. He continued by saying that even though the Fed has used all of its ammunitions 
regarding interest rate policy, the interest rates to households and companies in the US have 
remained as high as in Europe despite the ECB’s claimed lack of correct policy actions. 
Neither does Mr. Smaghi forget to mention how the global financial crisis came about largely 
because of keeping interest rates too low for too long. (Di Leo, 2008) 
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The motivation behind this study is to find out, if it is possible to evaluate the reasons, why 
the ECB has acted as seen since early 2007 by focusing on the framework, which the ECB’s 
policy is built on. Whether the ECB has truly been so misguided by its predictions and 
evaluations regarding the recent economic developments, that no reasons to act any differently 
were seen? Or whether the ECB has been closer to correct evaluations, but only because of 
some limitations in its current policy framework, it has not been able to follow other central 
banks’ examples fast enough of fighting against economic slowdown. This would then mean 
that the ECB should not have received such hard criticism over its actions, rather the criticism 
should be put on the whole European System of Central Banks (the ESCB), and the way 
monetary and fiscal policies are conducted in the euro area. It is very much possible that the 
European Central Bank has only followed the given approach and framework to its monetary 
policy choices, based on the best future estimates available.  
 
1.2 Objective, Methodology and Limitations 
 
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate whether the European Central Bank has been 
consistent in its monetary policy approach during the recent extraordinary financial 
conditions. Has the ECB been following its own chosen path for monetary policy, as given to 
it in the Treaty of the European Community (The Treaty) and further clarified by the ECB 
itself, or has the ECB’s approach to the monetary policy changed because of the global 
economic distress? The ECB’s monetary policy framework includes two separate aspects, 
namely economic and monetary analysis, and differs, at least explicitly, from the Federal 
Reserve’s approach to monetary policy, its main goals and targets. This paper is searching for 
evidence whether the widely criticised actions of the ECB can result from the consistency of 
monetary policy actions and goals, rather than serious misperceptions over the economic 
conditions, as criticised by several authors and commentators.   
 
The time-frame limitation for this paper is such that the evaluation will cover central banks’ 
actions until early 2009. Any forecasting of future monetary policy decisions will be left 
outside the scope. Also, it will not be relevant to estimate the effectiveness of the most recent 
policy actions, since there exist lagging periods before the benefits of the actions are visible in 
the economy.  
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1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The main objective of this paper being to evaluate the consistency of the European Central 
Bank’s monetary policy, it is first necessary to provide some background information of the 
common European system of central banking. This part, including a characterisation of the 
ECB’s policy framework and some statistics illustrating it, is covered in chapter 2. Chapter 3 
moves into more theoretical issues regarding the central banks’ role during financial crises. 
The recent reactions by the central banks to the global financial turmoil are listed and 
discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains a short empirical testing about the consistency of 
the ECB’s interest rate setting process related to changes in inflation expectations, money 
growth developments and future economic outlook. Chapter 6 then summarises the results and 
draws an overall picture of the ECB’s role in recent times. 
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2. The European Central Bank, Mission and Strategy 
 
This chapter covers the main characteristics behind the European Central Bank’s decision 
making process and its pivotal focuses over economic progress in the euro area. By starting 
from the history and establishment of a common central bank in the euro area, we gain a 
deeper understanding of some of the geopolitical issues affecting today’s monetary policy 
decisions. Furthermore, this section reflects the fact, that while the integration process in the 
European economy is yet undergoing, and certainly not finalized, it has already come a long 
way since World War II. We will further continue by explaining the mission and objectives of 
the ECB’s monetary policy instruments available to implement the chosen policy, and some 
limitations, which the central bank is currently facing in the euro area. After this, we will take 
a closer look at the two-pillar approach of the ECB’s policy framework. The focus will be on 
both theoretical and practical issues. 
 
The rest of the chapter reviews the heavily stressed role of price stability behind the ECB’s 
policy, and explains how the fiscal policy in the current European context is conducted. 
Regarding the role of price stability we are mostly interested in finding out how this role can 
have affected the recent, widely criticised, monetary policy decisions in the euro area. 
Regarding the fiscal policy, a short comparison between the US, Japan, and the euro area is 
necessary in order to understand differences in the fiscal policy stances among these regions. 
Finally, we bring the chapter together with some conclusions.          
 
2.1 History 
 
The European central bank has evolved over time, through various stages, treaties, and 
communities. One of the starting points could be the European Economic Community (EEC), 
which was established in 1958 by six Western European countries.1 In 1962 the EEC made its 
first proposal for an economic and monetary union, and by 1979 the European Monetary 
System (EMS) was created (Scheller, 2006). Other major steps on the road to the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the common currency euro, were the European Council’s 
agreement in June 1989 on the realisation of EMU, and the Treaty on European Union (the 
                                                          
1
 These six countries were Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The same 
countries had already in 1952 established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
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Maastricht Treaty) in February 1992, which eventually led to the establishment of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)2
                                                          
2
 There is an excellent introduction to the road to the euro, and to the birth of the ESCB and the ECB in 
Hanspeter K. Scheller’s book (2006): “The European Central Bank. The History, Role and Functions”. 
 
The legal basis for the ECB alone distinguishes it from the US Federal Reserve System or the 
Bank of Japan for the simple reason that the present European Union is not a nation state. 
Also, it is noticeable that EU membership does not automatically guarantee that a country will 
become a member of the euro area. This lack of automatic implementation can either be a 
country-, or ECB-based decision. Thus, while the Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan (BoJ) and 
the Bank of England (BoE) are the monetary authorities of their respective national states, the 
ECB conducts monetary policy among an economic area consisting of widely autonomous 
states. The integration process in the euro area is still developing further, and this process 
certainly has an influence on the ECB’s policy actions. 
 
The lack of a common fiscal policy in the euro area is one limiting factor when the central 
bank tries to stimulate economic growth in the euro area. Whereas in the US, the central bank 
and the finance ministry have shared a common worry and been able to cooperate effectively 
against the recent turbulence in the economy, the same has not been the case in the euro area. 
The integration process for the common European financial system started from the monetary 
side, by the establishment of the European Central Bank, who is responsible for price stability 
through the monetary policy among all member states. 
 
The other side of the coin, regarding the birth of a fully integrated financial union, is fiscal 
policy. Based on the modern ideas of Keynesian and New-Keynesian styles of economic 
approaches, fiscal policy is an important part of decreasing the effects of regular economic 
cycles. Furthermore, fiscal policy plays a central role in a crisis situation as seen in recent 
years. In the context of today’s disintegrated euro area, fiscal policy is still maintained at 
national levels, thus providing each nation state in the euro area a possibility to better 
concentrate and influence their own local priorities. And even though some common fiscal 
targets among the nations have been declared, very few of these are yet legally binding. This is 
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a characteristic of the euro area, which creates difficulties, also, for the ECB, when fighting 
against current financial turmoil.   
 
There has been much discussion over the ECB’s limited flexibility regarding quick changes in 
monetary policy. The Limiting factor here again is the structure of the euro area, including 
numerous autonomous states, with numerous autonomous parliaments and governments, each 
having their own preferences regarding economic and monetary policies. The ECB is an 
independent institution, but has not yet been completely convincing as such. Worth noticing is 
also that the common central bank in Europe does not have a history of many decades. While 
the Federal Reserve has seen several difficult eras during the 20th century, thus gaining 
learning experiences, which have further supported development of more effective central 
banking, the ECB lacks this kind of experience. One could say that the real smart ones learn 
from other’s mistakes. Unfortunately, the environment in which the ECB must conduct its 
policy is far from the Fed’s situation, as the President of the ECB Jean-Claude Trichet (2004) 
has described it, “…the ECB, which has been put in charge of the monetary policy of a totally 
new economic entity.” The complexity and disintegration of the euro area is an important 
aspect regarding the ECB’s policy reactions in a crisis situation, as seen in 2007-2008. 
 
2.2 Monetary Policy 
 
The monetary policy of the ECB was initially set up in 1998, and during the first years it 
received wide academic criticism over being too difficult to evaluate, including not enough 
predictability, and being too vague (ECB, 2004). Mostly because of this criticism, the policy 
was further clarified in 2003.3 Clearly, after this clarification the ECB began establishing a 
stronger position, not only in the European economy, but also in a more global perspective. 
With a strong commitment to its main objectives, the ECB gained high levels of 
accountability, transparency, and effectiveness of communication - all of which are high 
priorities for a central bank to function effectively. This evolution was relatively fast, mainly 
because of effective policy actions by the ECB, but the process was also further supported by 
ongoing stable economic conditions in the euro area. On the other hand, maintaining price 
stability was not supported by a slow pace of structural reform in the euro area (Meltzer, 
2008).  
                                                          
3
 Press releases related to both 1998 and 2003 policy announcements are available at www.ecb.eu/pub  
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The first element of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy is a quantitative definition of price 
stability. In addition, the strategy includes a framework, which ensures that monetary policy 
decisions are explained to the public in a clear and transparent manner. This open 
communication has been widely supported by academics (Rudebusch, 2008a). As stated 
above, strong commitment to the main objectives in addition to effective and reliable public 
communication has led the ECB to gain a strong position in the euro area.  
 
 2.2.1 Objectives 
 
“The ESCB is entrusted with one overriding objective: to maintain price 
stability. This goal is its single most important objective, the reason for which 
the System is created, briefly: its raison d’etre.” (Smits, 1997). 
 
First and foremost the European Central Bank acts to maintain price stability in the euro area.4 
This stability has been further explained and clarified, as maintaining the HICP (Harmonized 
Index of Consumer Prices) level at below but close to 2.00% per annum.5 Thus, the ECB has a 
clear inflation target, which is the leading indicator for its monetary policy. When compared 
to the Fed, the mandate for the ECB focuses heavily on the issues around inflation and price 
stability, while the Fed is also explicitly responsible for following more strictly the growth 
rate, level of employment, and overall conditions in the US economy.6 Later, when talking 
about the two-pillars behind the ECB’s policy decisions, it becomes obvious that similar 
economic indicators are not overlooked in the ECB’s policy either, but they are used more as a 
‘cross-check’ for the chosen policy actions. In the euro area the central bank is not, at least 
explicitly, mandated to maintain economic growth or a certain level of employment. 
Differences in the role of economic analysis could create a remarkable factor affecting the 
central bank policies, especially during times of financial turmoil. This issue will be looked at 
more carefully in section 2.3. 
 
                                                          
4
 Article 105 of the treaty establishing the European Community begins:” The primary objective of the ESCB 
shall be to maintain price stability.” 
5
 This formalization was announced in 2003. Initially in 1998, the target was, “Price stability shall be defined as a 
year-on-year increase in Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2.00%. Price 
stability is to be maintained over the medium term.” (ECB, 2004). 
6
 The Federal Reserve Act specifies that the Federal Reserve should, “promote effectively the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.” (Federal Reserve Act, section 2A). 
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It is yet way too simplified to state that the ECB exists only to maintain the price stability.  
The Treaty mentions, that “without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB 
shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to 
the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2”.7 Article 2 
mentions very similar objectives, as seen in the Federal Reserve Act, including: “a high level 
of employment, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and 
convergence of economic performance”. During the discussions over the constitution of the 
European Union, some politicians have even proposed that supporting sustainable growth and 
high levels of employment should be raised to an equal footing as regards the primary 
objectives of the ECB (Lenihan, 2006). It is incorrect to claim that the ECB only focuses on 
the inflation level, but compared to the Federal Reserve, the leading indicator behind policy 
decisions is the outlook for the euro area’s price stability. This is a difference worth keeping 
in mind when evaluating the choices made by the ECB in the recent economic storm. 
 
The role of the Federal Reserve as a responsible player regarding economic growth in the US 
is easily seen by looking at Figures 1a and 1b. These figures include the GDP growth rates and 
implemented interest rate levels in the US and in the euro area between 2001 and 2006. Both 
areas faced a slow pace of GDP growth in late 2001 and early 2002. The Fed, having a 
mandate including a responsibility for creating economic growth heavily decreased its fed 
funds rate from over 6.00% down to 1.75%, and kept decreasing the level in 2003 and 2004. 
The main purpose of gaining a stronger growth rate in the US GDP was attained. In this point 
of view, the results were good and clearly visible. The GDP growth rate having been almost 0 
in the last quarter of 2001, it rose to over 3.00% p.a. by autumn 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Lenihan (2006) further points out that the wording of the second part of the ESCB’s strategy is really, “…to 
support general economic policies (plural) in (rather than of) the Community.” This reflects the fact that the 
primary responsibility for economic policies is left to the member states rather than the community. The EU 
Growth and Stability Pact defines some of the main targets and guidelines for these policies. 
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Figure 1a: Fed Funds Rate and the US GDP Growth Rate 2000 (Q1) – 2006 (Q4) 
Fed Funds Rate vs. the US GDP Growth Rate
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve (www.tradingeconomics.com) 
 
The European Central Bank’s focus being on maintaining the target inflation level, it did not 
change interest rates as heavily as the Fed reacting to slow GDP growth rate faced in early 
2002. The ECB’s main refinancing interest rate was maintained at 3.25% p.a. until December 
2002, when it was decreased to 2.75% p.a. At this point, the fed funds rate was already at 
1.25% p.a. The less remarkable decreases by the ECB may also have played a part in much 
less rapid increase in the growth rate of the GDP in the euro area, compared to the one seen in 
the US.  
 
Figure 1b: ECB Main Refinancing Interest Rate and Euro Area GDP Growth Rate 2000 (Q1) – 2008 (Q4) 
ECB Main Refinancing Interest Rate vs. Euro Area GDP Growth Rate
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Regardless of the differences in interest rate levels between the euro area and the US in 2002-
2006, as seen in Figures 1a and 1b, both central banks have been accused of maintaining too 
low an interest rate level for too long. This is seen as another leading reason behind the recent 
economic problems. As Buiter and Sibert (2007) state, “The problems we are seeing today 
are the result of four to five years of (1) excessively low risk-free interest rates at all 
maturities  in the US, Euroland and Japan, and (2) ludicrously low credit risk spreads across 
the board (not just in the subprime mortgage markets).” 
 
During the recent liquidity crisis, there has been wide discussion over the central bank’s role 
as a lender of last resort, and how effectively it could and should provide liquidity in the 
market. Central banks all over the world have been forced to create ways to support the 
economy, after the sudden shocks in the latter part of 2008 when liquidity in the market was 
totally lost, and banks, as well as other business entities were fast running out of cash and thus 
having serious difficulties to continue their operations. Suddenly, there was no-one, except 
governments and central banks, who were considered reliable counterparties for lending 
money. 
  
More difficulties have arisen because of overly imaginative financial innovators who have 
created ever more complex new financing tools. Perhaps the most discussed innovation is the 
process where home mortgage loans were made available as investment opportunities through 
the process of securitisation. Especially in the US this field grew so fast that no credit rating 
agency, who were to evaluate and provide these new instruments with a certain risk 
categorisation, was able to keep up with the pace (Diamond & Rajan, 2009). Even though this 
development was more visible in the US than in the euro area, the global economic 
framework has spread the consequences of misinterpreted risks around the globe, as seen in 
fall 2008, when liquidity in the market suddenly disappeared.   
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Maintaining financial stability in today’s highly integrated European banking system has been 
seen as a difficult task to solve.8 Under normal conditions the financial stability in the euro 
area is managed at the national level. In particular, fiscal competence to deal with the banking 
crisis is the responsibility of national governments (Goodhart & Schoenmaker, 2009). Now, 
under the global financial crisis there have existed some contradictory opinions over the role 
of the central bank in returning and maintaining financial stability. Certainly, there exist 
differences regarding this issue, depending on whether analyzing a single nation framework, 
such as the Fed in the United States, or a multinational monetary area, such as the ECB and 
the euro area. 
 
Explicitly, neither the Federal Reserve Act nor the Treaty limits the central banks’ 
possibilities to support economic growth in their corresponding areas. Yet, contradiction 
exists. When the Act states: “the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as 
to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates,” the same in the Treaty is, “…to promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious and balanced development of economic activities9, sustainable and non-
inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence of economic 
performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard 
of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member 
States.”. Hence, if an economy is hit by sudden turbulence, the ECB should first be certain 
that the downturn affects all numerous individual nation states in the common monetary 
policy union. 
 
By looking at the mandates given to the ECB and the Fed, there are a few issues related to 
handling a financial crisis worth noticing. First of all, the ECB’s main task being so strongly 
centered around price stability, this must limit its possibilities to react to temporary 
disturbances as flexibly as the Fed can. On the other hand, the whole working environment, in 
which the ECB must conduct its policy, is so complex compared to the United States that 
regardless of relevant similarities in the policy tools available, the lack of common fiscal 
policy alone has decreased the power of policy-lead stimulus packages in Europe. Next, the 
                                                          
8
 Goodhart & Schoenmaker (2009) provide more theoretical modelling of fiscal burden sharing on possible 
recapitalization of failing cross-border banks in the euro area. They show that more localised (specific) burden 
sharing results in better cost-benefit value than more collective generic burden sharing. 
9
 Bolding added by the author. 
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main instruments for the European Central Bank to implement its policy decisions and to 
support and maintain any possibly liquidity needs are discussed. 
 
 
 2.2.2 Instruments 
 
In this part, the main instruments which the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) uses 
in order to reach its objectives will be covered briefly. Introductions of the instruments will 
follow the order of the ECB’s booklet “The implementation of monetary policy in the euro 
area, November 2008.” Some relevant comparisons with other central banks, especially with 
the Fed, will also be made. For the purpose of this paper, it will be interesting and important 
to gain an understanding of how differences in available instruments may have led to different 
policy decisions during the recent financial turmoil. Hence, it may be that part of the criticism 
directed at the ECB is only based on the fact that in the euro area there are limited instruments 
available to conduct monetary policy, compared to those available in the US. These possible 
legal or statutory differences create an important issue for us to examine.  
 
First of all, the most common monetary policy instrument for a central bank is to conduct 
different open market operations. With the ECB this includes five types of instruments: 1) 
reverse transactions, 2) outright transactions, 3) issuance of debt certificates, 4) foreign 
exchange swaps, and 5) collection of fixed-term deposits (ECB, 2008). These operations can 
also be classified according to their aims and regularities. This classification then includes all 
of the following: main refinancing operations, the longer-term refinancing operations, fine-
tuning operations, and structural operations. While the main refinancing operations are the 
most pivotal in pursuing the objectives of the ECB under normal circumstances, it has been 
the fine-tuning operations, which have played the biggest and most noticeable role during the 
current turmoil. The fine-tuning operations are used to manage shorter term liquidity 
situations, which have been especially critical during the last year. These are the central 
bank’s main tools for unexpected sudden changes in liquidity situations. In chapter 4, we will 
take a more careful look at how these tools have been used lately, and why some academics 
have written so negatively and pessimistically on these actions. 
 
Another important set of instruments has recently been standing facilities. These are aimed to 
provide or absorb overnight liquidity, hence signalling the stance of monetary policy and 
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affecting the overnight market interest rates. Generally, there are two separate facilities 
available, the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility (ECB, 2008). The former 
basically sets a ceiling for the overnight market interest rate, while the latter sets the floor 
level. Normally, these rates are not tempting for banks, since market rates are better for them. 
This is to say that these instruments serve only to provide and absorb liquidity in exceptional 
circumstances. This becomes clear when looking at Figure 2, which illustrates the levels of 
marginal lending facilities used in the euro area since 1999. Times of financial or economic 
turmoil draw peaks onto the graph.    
 
Figure 2: Marginal Lending Facility in the Euro Area since 1999 
Marginal Lending Facility - Euro Area
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Data: European Central Bank, Statistical Warehouse. http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/home.do. 
 
The third main instrument used by the ECB is the holding of minimum reserve requirements 
to credit institutions in the euro area (ECB, 2008), thus again influencing the liquidity in the 
market, and also stabilising money market interest rates. The latter is performed mainly by so 
called averaging provision.10 The reserve requirement system is more essential in the ECB’s 
system, than for the Fed or the Bank of Japan. The latter central banks’ levels for reserve 
requirements are relatively much lower than the ones held in the Eurosystem. The most 
extreme case is the Bank of England, which does not impose any reserve requirements subject 
to averaging. Hence, while the ECB here has another tool for liquidity management, the other 
main central banks have to be more focused on daily developments and hence to operate on 
                                                          
10
 For the ECB, averaging provision means, ”A provision allowing counterparties to fulfil their reserve 
requirements on the basis of their average reserve holdings over the maintenance period. The averaging provision 
contributes to the stabilisation of money market interest rates by giving institutions an incentive to smooth the 
effects of temporary liquidity fluctuations.” 
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the basis of daily, or more than daily, open market operations. This difference provides 
another support for the ECB’s more stable policy framework, also regarding the 
implementation phase. 
 
 2.2.3. Limitations  
 
Some of the limiting factors regarding policy decisions and implementations have already 
been touched on including the heterogeneity of the euro area. Conducting monetary policy that 
would benefit all member states in the area is not only a politically fragile issue, but also 
includes some more legal or statutory problems. These have become a part of politicians’ and 
academics’ discussions, while central banks have been forced to modify their policy 
instruments.  
 
A decentralised Eurosystem with regional central banks having a strong voice in the decision 
making process, provides us with another explanation for the ECB’s lack of proactive policy 
moves. In terms of voting power, the position of the Executive Board within the Eurosystem 
is relatively weak (de Haan, et.al., 2005). This is not the only noticeable limitation for the 
Executive Board. The Board has the responsibility to set up meetings of the ECB Governing 
Council, but it does not have an exclusive power of initiative. Also, the Executive Board has 
no budgetary autonomy, since the Governing Council has to approve the budget. Perhaps most 
remarkably, considering the recent times, is that the ECB has no control over the many 
activities performed by national central banks. They are free to perform certain functions. The 
ECB is able to restrict some of these functions with a two-thirds majority decision, if these are 
seen to interfere with the objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem (de Haan, et.al., 2005). 
 
Overall, the limitations for the ECB come mainly through the decentralised working 
environment, in which it conducts policy decisions. Although, under more stable economic 
conditions most of national central banks are usually in line with the ECB regarding common 
objectives and targets, this may have changed under the recent financial turmoil. These 
objectives are led by the price stability goal, which has been under severe pressure in several 
national central banks’ decisions, since they have been more or less forced to support their 
suffering local economies, thus giving up some of the main guiding principles regarding price 
stability. The less effective the ECB is, the more incentives there are for national central banks 
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to deviate from common monetary policy guidelines. The ECB should consider this in its 
decision making process. Furthermore, the increasing centralisation in the euro area will make 
common monetary policy ever more effective in the future. 
 
2.3 Two-Pillar Approach 
 
“No central bank has so far made a commitment to a simple instrument rule 
like the Taylor rule or variants thereof” (Svensson, 2003). 
 
The European Central Bank has assigned a special role to money in its decision making 
process, and also received a lot of criticism over this. Most inflation-targeting central banks 
do not focus heavily on monetary aggregates (Beck & Wieland, 2007). The ECB’s two-pillar 
strategy, on the other hand, includes both economic and monetary analysis. There has never 
been a formal mathematical exposition of the strategy published, but throughout its history the 
ECB has clearly stated that it distinguishes between these two types of analyses, and the 
decisions over the monetary policy in the euro area are based on both these analyses (Beck & 
Wieland, 2007).  
 
As the ECB’s policy cannot be said to be an inflation-targeting strategy, Rudebusch and 
Svensson (2002) name it “a combination of a weak type of monetary targeting and an implicit 
form of inflation targeting.” The reason is that the ECB does not follow a simple formulation 
in which money growth is an intermediate target variable, such that it is always brought in line 
with reference value. While the first pillar focuses on this monetary issue, the second contains 
more widely evaluated topics and variables related to inflation forecasts. Yet, there exists no 
direct and public comparison of an inflation forecast to an announced target. According to 
Rudebusch and Svensson (2004) this is an important element of an explicit inflation targeting 
strategy. Hence, the ECB’s policy does not fit fully into any traditional theoretical central 
bank policy model. 
 
Note here that even though no central bank, at least explicitly, follows a simple instrument 
rule, the Fed does include the Taylor rule in the context of its booklet about the role and 
monetary policy tools and framework in the US. This is another demonstration, that the Fed’s 
role is much more economic output oriented than the ECB’s. Yet, it needs to be stressed that 
  18 
the Fed does not at any point claim that its monetary policy decisions would be based on the 
Taylor rule, or any of its variants. 
 
The two-pillar approach to monetary policy is how the ECB characterises its regular analyses 
and justifications behind policy implementations. There are two clearly distinctive parts of 
macroeconomics evaluated, namely economic and monetary issues. These provide the basis 
for the ECB’s monetary policy decisions, regarding the level of interest rates and other 
liquidity providing or absorbing actions. Next, these two pillars will be studied more closely.   
  
 2.3.1 Economic Analysis 
 
This economic analysis assesses the short- to medium-term determinants of price 
developments. This part of the strategy focuses on real activity and financial conditions in the 
economy (ECB, 2004). Obviously, during the last several years, this analysis has played an 
increasingly important role in the decision making process of the ECB. In an environment 
with relatively stable short- and medium-term expectations for economic conditions, it has not 
been a difficult task for the ECB to maintain targeted price stability. Difficulties, however, 
may arise when the economy is hit by some sudden shocks affecting the short- and medium 
term conditions. A central bank willing to maintain a certain level of inflation in the medium 
term will have to decide how serious these shocks are, how the longer term conditions will be 
affected, and if these effects will have any specific impact on future inflation, hence on price 
stability. Depending then on the mandate given to the central bank, it may either focus more 
on short-term growth expectations for the economy, or maintain its longer term perspective 
toward price stability, even though it may further strengthen some short term negative changes 
in economic conditions.  
 
The ECB’s economic analysis tries to take into account all factors which are helpful in 
assessing the dynamics of real activity and likely developments in prices. The ECB’s 
governing council’s target is to have a comprehensive understanding of the prevailing 
economic situation, focusing especially on awareness of the specific nature and magnitude of 
any disturbances. Regularly reviewed variables are those relating to developments in overall 
output, demand and labour market conditions, a broad range of price and cost indicators, fiscal 
policy, and the balance of payments for the euro area (ECB, 2004). In addition, developments 
  19 
in financial market indicators, asset prices and developments in the exchange rate are also 
closely monitored. Many of the economic variables listed above are often discussed in the 
ECB’s monthly bulletins. This illustrates the comprehensiveness of the decision making 
process, and stresses the weight given to any threats regarding price stability. 
 
 2.3.2 Monetary Analysis 
 
A number of academic studies (Assenmacher-Wesche & Gerlach, 2007, Svensson, 2003, etc.) 
on monetary growth and inflation have shown that a close relationship exists between these 
two when focusing on medium to long run perspectives. In a short-run this relationship does 
not seem to be particularly strong (Assenmacher-Wesche & Gerlach, 2007). Since the ECB’s 
main objective is to maintain price stability in the medium-term horizon, these findings have 
given a justification to use monetary aggregates as reliable and firm measurements of future 
expected inflation development. Hence, monetary analysis plays an important role in the 
decision making process of the ECB. The importance of this role has been further emphasised 
by setting a certain reference value for monetary growth,11 as regards to the main objective of 
having a target value for the inflation level.  
 
Looking at Figure 3, it is noticeable that since 2001 the actual M3 growth rate in the euro area 
seems to have been clearly higher than the initially set reference value of 4.5% p.a. This then, 
at least partly, indicates that just as the ECB stated, monetary policy cannot react mechanically 
to deviations of the M3 growth from the reference value, since these deviations can also occur 
because of several factors caused by institutional changes (ECB, 2004). For example, during 
2007-2008 there has been a strong movement in money holdings, mainly relating to flat yield 
curve, thus making shorter term investment options more attractive relative to less liquid 
components (Trichet & Papademos, 2008). This movement will lead to an overestimation of 
the growth rate of M3 in a short-run. The ECB’s monetary analysis will, at least theoretically, 
attack this problem effectively by extending its analysis far beyond the assessment of just M3 
growth rate relative to its reference value.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 The ESCB will monitor monetary developments against the reference value (4.5% p.a.) of three-month moving 
averages of the monthly twelve months growth rates of broad monetary aggregate M3. For more information, see 
the ECB’s press release on December 1, 1998. Available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/1998/html/pr981201_3.en.html  
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Figure 3: Annual growth rate of M3 in the Euro area 1/2000 – 2/2008 
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The previously stated reference value is not a strict monetary target but a benchmark for 
analysing the relevant information. As Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) put it, “This strategy 
appears to be a combination of a weak type of monetary targeting and an implicit form of 
inflation targeting.” They continue, “Nevertheless, the Eurosystem has made it clear that 
deviations of money growth from the reference value will be treated as a major factor in its 
policy decisions.” Figure 3 supports the slightly less important role played by the variations 
from the M3 growth rate reference value. On the other hand, this is evidence that the ECB’s 
monetary policy is not based only on monetary analysis, rather the two-pillars provide a wide 
base for each implemented decision. 
 
The context of monetary analysis is not limited to the assessment of the M3 growth. Several 
other monetary variables are monitored on a regular basis as well. One often mentioned in the 
editorials of the ECB’s monthly bulletins is the development in the components of M3. This 
factor is one of the explanations for the long lasting variation from the reference value. For 
example, in May 2007, a couple of months before the ECB’s controversial decision to 
increase its main refinancing interest rate, the annual growth rate of M3 was 10.9%, clearly 
above the reference value. The interest rate decision was still pushed forward since the 
editorials stated that 
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“Short-term monetary and credit developments can be affected, inter alia, by 
the shape of the yield curve and external factors, and be subject to some degree 
of volatility. Looking through such transitory aspects, there are, however, 
several indications that higher short-term interest rates are influencing 
monetary dynamics, although they have not, as yet, significantly dampened the 
overall strength of these dynamics. For example, increases in short-term rates 
have served to moderate the expansion of the narrow aggregate M1, in recent 
quarters, but its annual growth is still robust.” 
(ECB’s Monthly Bulletins, May 2007) 
 
Another important factor is changes in credit extended to the private sector. Note here, that 
this is probably one of the factors receiving increasing attention in the future, since this relates 
to an important issue behind the recent financial turmoil, namely a credit-bubble. 
  
 2.3.3 Cross-Checking 
 
The cross-checking procedure in the ECB’s policy operations only means that the economic 
and monetary analyses are both taken into account in the decision making process. This is to 
limit the possibility of clear errors that could result from blindly following the growth rate of 
money in the economy. This could cause the central bank to conduct too strict a monetary 
policy, which eventually leads to slowdown in economic activity, and then possibly 
unnecessary actions by the central banks and governments to further boost the depressing 
economy. Unnecessary, as these actions could have been avoided by a correct analysis about 
the true reasons behind temporary acceleration in the growth rate of M3. The correct analysis, 
in the ECB’s framework, should be received through the cross-checking procedure. A more 
theoretical examination of the purpose of the ECB’s cross-checking method is provided by 
Beck and Wieland (2007). 
 
The ECB’s monetary policy strategy has not proved to be easily digestible to academics, even 
less so to politicians and the public. The ECB’s two-pillar strategy can be seen as a good 
example of a modern, very procedural notion of a monetary policy framework. Ben Bernanke 
(2004) writes that the ECB’s policy is hard to fit into any category in the spectrum of different 
interest rate setting rules. Although the policy framework itself seems to be quite widely 
accepted, and the comprehensiveness of different aspects analysed highly valued, there are 
clear limitations and complications regarding communication compared to a simpler 
representation of inflation targeting. ”At the same time it arguably provides a more explicit 
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and stable framework than an eclectic multi-indicator approach of ‘looking at everything’” 
(Stark, 2007). 
 
2.4 The Role of Price Stability and Consequences in Policy Implementations 
 
To explain the importance of price stability the European Central Bank lists the benefits of 
maintaining it as follows: 
 
Table 1: The Benefits of Price Stability 
 
Improving the transparency of relative prices should lead to better investment and 
consumption decisions by firms and consumers. This makes resource allocation in the market 
more efficient. Reducing inflation risk premia in interest rates reduces the demand 
compensation for holding longer term assets. A central bank’s credibility is a key 
characteristic in achieving this goal. The third benefit listed, namely to avoid unnecessary 
hedging activity, is also related to the central bank’s credibility. The more reliable and 
trustworthy a central bank is in maintaining price stability, the less incentive for different 
hedging strategies against inflation exists (Rudebusch, 2008a). 
 
Benefits four through six in Table 1 are all related to equality among firms and consumers. 
For the ECB these goals are even more important to reach than for a central bank, whose 
working environment is a single nation state. In the twentieth century, there are several 
The benefits of price stability 
 
1) Improves the transparency of relative prices 
 
2) Reduces inflation risk premia in interest rates 
 
3) Avoids unnecessary hedging activity 
 
4) Reduces distortions of tax and social security systems 
 
5) Increases the benefits of holding cash 
 
6) Prevents the arbitrary redistribution of wealth and income 
 
Source: “The Monetary Policy of the ECB 2004” (ECB, 2004) 
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examples of high inflation eras leading to social and political instability.12 In the euro area, 
where economic conditions are still uneven to start with, losing price stability could soon lead 
to local, and even European wide, discontent with the ECB and the European Union. 
Furthermore, if price stability started to look less permanent, this could give nation states 
incentives to support their local economies with fiscal policy tools, thus decreasing fiscal 
integration in the euro area, and creating protectionism within the euro area borders. The 
consequences of both scenarios will be covered later in this paper. 
 
The ECB’s policy stance of maintaining the euro area’s price stability in medium- to longer-
term perspectives is, therefore, to support broader economic goals. These goals are 
comparable to those explicitly given to the Federal Reserve. Whether price stability truly leads 
to a substantial contribution of achieving higher standards of living, high levels of economic 
activity and better employment perspectives, as listed by the ECB (ECB, 2004), continues to 
be a controversial topic. Otmar Issing (2005) states that: “We must be aware that price 
stability is not a sufficient condition for financial stability”, and continues, “Interestingly it 
has recently even been suggested that the conventional wisdom that price stability is good for 
financial stability has to be reversed”. 
 
Without a deeper analysis the effectiveness of price stability to overall economic conditions, it 
can be concluded that specific institutional features of central bank independence vary across 
different constitutional traditions and governmental provisions. The independence of the ECB 
is very much related to improving price stability in the euro area. This independence needs to 
be created with enough consensus on the common goals among the member states. This is the 
only way to attain sufficient commitment to these targets in order for the ECB to act 
effectively. The next section explains some fiscal policy tools, which play a crucial role in the 
overall validity of the ECB’s actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 The most significant certainly is the hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920s, but there are also more recent 
examples like Yugoslavia between 1993 and 1994, and Latin American countries led by Argentina and Bolivia in 
the 1970s and 1980s. (Salemi, 2009) 
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2.5 Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area 
 
A common currency requires common monetary and exchange rate policies, which in the euro 
area are set up under the ECB and the ESCB.13 Unlike these centralised policies, economic 
and fiscal policy decisions are largely left as national states’ responsibilities. There are some 
principal guidelines directing each member state’s conduct of economic policy, regarding 
issues like public finance, taxation, labour market regulation, etc. These guidelines are, 
however, more recommendations, and are not legally binding. This creates various sharp 
differences in policies among member states, thus affecting the well-being of the overall euro 
area. 
 
Yet, the importance of fiscal sustainability is stressed by the ECB in an article in its monthly 
bulletin in February 2007, “Fiscal sustainability is prerequisite for stability, growth and 
cohesion in the monetary union”. In the editorials of the ECB’s monthly bulletins the member 
countries have continuously been urged to meet the levels set in the Stability and Growth 
Pact14 as soon as possible and by 2010 at the latest. The recent financial crisis has needed such 
exceptional treatment that by the end of 2009, the ECB ceased from explicitly stating these 
targets, since it became clear that every member states cannot be forced to meet these fiscal 
obligations because of the global economic downturn. Yet, a clear disadvantage in the euro 
area is that today there exist requirements that limit substantially the use of expansive fiscal 
policies at a domestic level. In a situation where the whole euro area is hit by an economic 
crisis, seen recently, decreases to these limitations are soon negotiated, and expansive policies 
approved. Unfortunately for the countries facing a local crisis, this kind of negotiation may 
never take place.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 The exchange rate policy in the euro area is actually conducted jointly by the ECB and the ECOFIN council, 
with the council having the final say (Scheller, 2007). 
14
 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is an agreement by European Union member states related to their 
conduct of fiscal policy, to facilitate and maintain Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union.  
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On the other hand, Article 104 of the EC Treaty provides a procedure for fiscal policies in the 
euro area, which is legally binding and enforceable. During the recent financial turmoil, a 
question raised is whether the level of autonomy in economic and fiscal policies in the euro 
area has deleveraged the ECB’s possibilities to react to and ease the current crisis with enough 
flexibility? As Scheller (2007) writes: “…the rules and procedures of the economic policy 
framework ensure macroeconomic stability, provided that the policy-makers respect them”.  
In chapter 4 we will take a closer look at this issue, and evaluate whether the policy-makers in 
the member states have respected the rules under the tremendous pressure to support their 
local economies.  
 
2.6 Conclusions 
  
Overall, it is clear that even though the central banks always have quite similar objectives and 
relatively common tools to conduct their policies, some remarkable differences exist among 
the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve. The differences, including how the 
central banks explicitly approach the interest rate setting process and its targets, have 
previously affected interest rate levels in the euro area compared to the level seen in the US. 
The Federal Reserve, being more focused on maintaining economic growth, hence having a 
less direct emphasis on inflation levels and growth of monetary and credit aggregates, has 
more flexibility in its monetary policy framework regarding situations where proactive policy 
actions are required. 
 
On the other hand, the ECB’s two-pillar framework does provide what looks like a target to a 
more stable economic and monetary environment, which several studies see as a precondition 
for maintaining sustainable economic growth. Furthermore, this approach should better 
prevent a future birth of economic and financial bubbles. The downside is that in a situation 
where a bubble has already been created, the ECB’s monetary policy approach does not 
necessarily provide enough support to first-aid actions, which would stimulate economic 
growth, thus decreasing the negative impact from strengthening downward development. 
 
Another important aspect covered in this chapter was the less than complete integration 
process in the euro area. The whole working environment for the ECB is quite different from 
those of the Fed, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan. The ECB environment includes 
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numerous autonomous nation states, each responsible for their own fiscal policies, and each 
with their own characteristics and own special interests. All this limits the ECB’s choice of 
actions especially when there is as serious a turmoil in the market as recently seen.  
 
Next attention will be directed toward the central banks’ role in the financial crises. Keeping 
in mind what has been covered here, it should be noticeable that the differences in objectives, 
monetary policy approaches, and tools available, do influence central banks’ actions and 
possibilities during times of turmoil. 
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3. Central Banks’ Role in Financial Crises 
 
Under stable economic conditions and in an ordered market, central banks should manage 
their objectives relatively easily, at least theoretically (Buiter & Sibert, 2007). Conducting 
monetary policy is quite straightforward as long as all underlying economic and monetary 
variables are known for certain. Problems arise when a financial crisis strikes, and 
unfortunately, throughout financial history times of turmoil have kept following each other. 
Finding a recipe, which could prevent these crises, would be certain to lead to receiving the 
Noble prize for economics, but since this recipe is yet unknown, central banks are forced to 
prepare themselves for also dealing with financial crises, liquidity squeezes, and credit 
crunches. 
 
This chapter will take us through some of the main issues regarding the role of the central 
banks during financial unrest. First, we will review some of the criticism laid against the 
central banks’ actions during the recent downturn. Then we will move on by looking at some 
more theoretical aspects of the role of money in interest rate rules, and how monetary stability 
is seen with respect to financial stability. These are issues often covered in academic 
literature, while studying optimal interest rate settings (Evans & Honkapohja, 2003; Svensson, 
2003, etc.). Continuing on the theoretical side, we will also consider some of the issues 
regarding the central banks’ functions and problems within a liquidity crisis situation. Finally, 
we will conclude the chapter, and move on to evaluate more closely the recent actions of the 
ECB and the Fed, using this chapter’s theoretical basis as our framework. 
 
3.1 Recent Criticism 
 
Following are two different examples of criticism laid on the central banks, especially on the 
European Central Bank regarding its actions, or lack of actions since the beginning of the 
ongoing crisis. The criticism has been wide, and has come from different sources, like 
academics shown here, but also from politicians, for example French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy has been keen on criticizing the ECB’s reactions. This paper will mainly only include 
the criticism from academics, thus leaving out a deeper evaluation of any national level or 
more politically motivated comments from Sarkozy, and so on. This is not to say that their 
comments would be any less valuable or less trustworthy. 
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“The announcement today of coordinated liquidity injections by FED, ECB, 
BoE, BoC, SNB is however too little too late and it will fail to resolve the 
liquidity and credit crunch for the same reasons why hundreds of billions of 
dollars of liquidity injections by these central banks – and some easing of 
policy rates by Fed, BoC and BoE – has totally and miserably failed to resolve 
this crunch in the last five months.” 
(Roubini, 2008). 
 
Notice here, that Roubini still stresses the fact that the ECB has eased its monetary policy far 
less and clearly more slowly than its counter parties. Liquidity injections, which will be 
covered later in this paper, do not convince Roubini as being effective reactions toward the 
recent crisis. He continues by explaining that most of the crunch is due to serious credit and 
solvency problems, not just to illiquidity. Thus, monetary policy tools are not suited to solving 
these problems. 
 
He also points out that a large contributing factor behind the crisis is a recent change in the 
financial system’s structure. This will become more clear later in this paper, but briefly it 
means that while depository institutions (commercial banks) have traditionally been financing 
sources in the market, and hence central banks have mainly merely acted as the lender of last 
resort for these institutions, the market today is not quite as straightforward. So called, non-
depository institutions have taken a larger role in fulfilling the financial needs of companies. 
New financial innovations have been created, and the central banks’ original tools, created as 
back-up for depository institutions, are not capable of solving all existing problems in the 
financial markets. The change has been more dramatic in the US, but it has also affected the 
ECB’s working environment (Roubini, 2008).  
 
 “We are already, however, well into the realm of what I call depression 
economics. By that I mean a state of affairs like that of the 1930s in which the 
usual tools of monetary policy – above all the Federal Reserve’s ability to 
pump up the economy by cutting interest rates – have lost all traction.” 
(Krugman, 2008). 
 
This critique by Nobel laureate Paul Krugman illustrates how at the end of the year 2008, the 
question among several authors in public and in academic papers was not so much whether 
the ECB should also decrease its main refinancing interest rate to zero, rather what other 
options and tools after this move should be used in the euro area, as well as in the US. In this 
issue, the pivotal question has been whether central banks should create more liquidity by 
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repurchasing government bonds. For the Fed this has been a natural next step after interest 
rates were lowered to practically zero. As previously discussed in chapter 2, for the ECB this 
whole procedure would turn out to be a much more difficult task including questions such as, 
which countries’ bonds should be bought, how these bonds should be priced between the 
countries, and so on. Krugman’s main point, that all central banks are forced to create 
extraordinary actions and tools, remains.  
 
3.2 The Role of Money in Interest Rate Rules 
 
The role of money growth aggregates, while deciding on monetary policy has been an argued 
topic among academics and policy makers (Rudebusch & Svensson 2002; Bernanke 2004, 
etc.). The European Central Bank does provide a much more significant role for monetary 
aggregates in its two-pillar framework than do most other inflation targeting central banks, 
especially the Federal Reserve. The way the ECB implements this role under its monetary 
policy framework is explained in the previous chapter. The amount of emphasis put on 
monetary aggregates in recent exceptional financial conditions is still difficult to evaluate, but 
from the Monthly Bulletins of the ECB it becomes obvious that the contradiction between the 
short-term fluctuations, which should not affect the main policy decisions, and the medium- to 
long-term changes has been difficult to establish. Furthermore, since the economic slowdown 
has put more emphasis on economic analysis, it initially appears as if the monetary policy’s 
role has recently diminished. In chapters 4 and 5, we will also evaluate this change based on 
some empirical data. 
 
It needs to be stressed, that the ECB does not consider monetary analysis as a prior guiding 
principal of its policy decisions, rather it serves mainly as a cross-check from a medium- to 
long-term perspective (Beck & Wieland, 2007). A ‘new Keynesian’ model of inflation 
determination allocates no role for the quantity of money in future inflation estimation 
(Woodford, 2007). Stefan Gerlach (2003, 2004) has presented some evidence for the long-run 
relationship between money growth and inflation. This low-frequency relationship thus 
supports the ECB’s idea of using monetary aggregates in its policy making process. During 
times of financial turmoil, as seen since early 2007, it may have been that this cross-checking 
process has made the ECB more cautious in lowering its interest rates than the central banks, 
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giving less emphasis on monetary aggregates. For a more theoretical background we will 
follow the structure of Beck and Wieland’s (2007) paper.  
 
The article by Guenter Beck and Volker Wieland (2007) characterises ECB-style cross-
checking and policy design. They formulate a proposed interest-rate rule as having two 
components: 
 
   itCC = itEA + itMA,   (1) 
 
where CC refers to cross-checking, and EA and MA to previously introduced economic and 
monetary analysis, respectively. From here, the next step is to set the first component equal to 
the optimal interest-rate rule responding to the lagged inflation and output gaps, but not to 
money growth development15, hence, 
 
   itEA = itopt.    (2) 
 
This interest-rate setting controls inflationary risks, and ensures that inflation fluctuates 
around the targeted mean pi*. Unfortunately, for policy makers, the components behind this are 
unobservable such as the equilibrium real interest rate r* and potential output y*. The latter 
especially, has received a great deal of academic interest because of its role behind the 
monetary policy rules in which interest rate is the chosen policy instrument (Evans and 
Honkapohja 2003, Svensson, 2003, etc.).  
 
Note here, that as Gerlach (2008) explains, survey measures such as the Purchasing Managers 
Index constructed by Markit (www.markit.com) and the Economic Sentiment Index published 
by Eurostat have some clear advantages over the output gap measure. The sentiment index 
will also be used later in the empirical analysis. These advantages include  
 
 
                                                          
15
 Beck and Wieland (2007) defines the itopt in the equation (2) as itopt = rt* + pit-1 + 
ryβα
1 (pit-1 - pi*) + 
*)y - (y
1
1-t1-trβ  
  31 
- monthly availability versus quarterly for real GDP data 
- much faster availability compared to the GDP data 
- advance movement related to the output gap 
 
All these aspects are important when trying to analyse the ECB’s policy decisions. If decisions 
were based more heavily on the survey measures, which on the other hand would effectively 
predict the output gap development, the policy would fairly quickly respond to changes in the 
real economic outlook. This would then naturally change in a situation where the survey 
indicators would no longer reliably forecast the actual changes in the real GDP development. 
This is another important factor, which should be considered when criticising the ECB’s 
recent reactions. 
 
Beck and Wieland continue by examining how the second component of the ECB’s cross-
checking framework, namely itMA is intended to offset persistent policy bias due to imperfect 
information especially regarding the output gap. They begin with the assumption that the 
central bank regularly tests whether filtered and adjusted money growth still averages around 
the inflation target. Here the main focus is on the policy-relevant medium- to longer-term 
development, as often stated in the editorials of the monthly bulletins. 
 
In Beck’s and Wieland’s formalised model, the central bank computes the normally 
distributed test statistic, including the filtered and adjusted money growth µf, target inflation 
pi*, and the standard deviation σµf. The computed test statistic then is, 
 
   κ = f
1
µσ
piµ ∗
−
−
f
t
.    (3) 
 
Now, as long as itEA = itopt is implemented with full knowledge of potential output y* and the 
real economic rate of return r*, cross-checking, using κ, will rarely lead to an adjustment in 
interest rates. With imperfect knowledge, however, cross-checking may occasionally have 
very important effects on policy. This is, yet, another explanation of the ECB’s commitment 
to stable longer-term price stability, with less emphasis placed on shorter-term, temporary 
fluctuations in economic conditions.  
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3.3 Monetary Stability versus Financial Stability   
 
An important aspect, which central banks need to bear in mind during an era of financial 
distress, and especially when the economy is heading into such an era, is consumer 
psychology. “If everyone expects a crisis and acts as if one is about to occur, then the crisis 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Conversely, if no one expects a crisis, this expectation is 
also self-fulfilling and no crisis occurs” (Allen & Gale, 2007). This further illustrates the 
importance of proactive actions in both financial and monetary policies in preventing 
economic recessions.  
 
Comparing the mandates given to the ECB and to the Federal Reserve, it initially seems that 
the Federal Reserve System is more suitable for keeping the economy away from recessions, 
since it may promote consumer confidence by lowering its interest rates without paying as 
much attention to price stability as does the ECB. In the short-run, this may give the Fed more 
room to act, which in this current situation may partly have led to recent interest rate 
lowerings being faster in the US than in the euro area. Unfortunately for the Fed, it is arguably 
devastating for the economy in the longer run, if the central bank too strongly emphasises 
stimulating short-run growth, thus increasing the possibility of future inflation level 
expansion. The ECB’s mandate, on the other hand, first and foremost, maintains focus on 
medium- to longer-term stability and the well-being of the economy. 
 
Figures 4a and 4b illustrate consumer confidence in the euro area and in the US, respectively. 
Between 2002-2004 both areas experienced a strong decline in consumer confidence, which 
was noticed by the central banks by lowered interest rate levels. At this point, the ECB did not 
see any significant medium- to longer-term pressures on the inflation level, and hence was 
able to conduct a decrease in the main refinancing rate from 3.25% in November 2002 down 
to 2.00% in June 200316. A similar reduction by the Fed led the fed funds rate to decrease 
from 1.75% in October 2002 to 1.00% in June 2003.  
 
 
                                                          
16
 Editorials in the monthly bulletins by the ECB in 2002 and 2003 do in several cases illustrate this low upside 
pressure on price stability when looking at the policy-relevant horizon. 
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Figure 4a: Euro Area Consumer Confidence 
1/2000 – 2/2008 
  
 
Figure 4b: United States Consumer Confidence 
1/2000 – 2/2008 
 
One reason for the Federal Reserve not being able to proactively sustain consumer confidence 
and decrease the strength of the recent downturn in the economy is a certain lack of effective 
communication by the Federal Reserve over its economic forecasts (Rudebusch, 2008a). As 
stated previously, the ECB has gained public and academic credit for developing transparency, 
thus making it easier to forecast and predict the future road of its monetary policy. This is 
important for consumer confidence, since less predictability leads to more uncertainty, which, 
as seen in 2008, further lowers confidence.  
 
Another aspect of the possible low quality of communication by a central bank is that, if 
financial market participants understand the policy makers’ expectations, then long-term 
interest rates and other asset prices may respond more appropriately to incoming data 
(Rudebusch, 2008a). Naturally, this would make the central bank’s policy actions more 
effective and probably decrease the lag between actions and their results to the real economy. 
This lag being another important aspect of the recent financial crisis, since the downturn in the 
world economy was so sudden, and especially the financial sector needed an immediate cure 
and rescue. 
 
3.4 Liquidity Crises and Credit Crunches 
 
Dealing with liquidity squeezes in the market has become a seriously more difficult task for 
central banks than previously. This is because of an increased role of other sources of funding 
in place of traditional commercial banks. Market liquidity suffers when it is difficult to raise 
money by selling assets at reasonable prices (Brunnermaier 2009, et.al.). This reflects the 
situation seen in September 2008, when suddenly faith in the financial markets was lost, and 
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pricing of assets used in raising money was put under severe doubt. Under stable economic 
conditions, running monetary policy effectively should not be too difficult, but overcoming or 
even preventing a financial crisis is, from a historical perspective a hard task. Even harder, for 
central bankers, is to somehow move away from liquidity problems in the market without 
creating a fertile platform for a new credit and liquidity boom (Buiter & Sibert, 2007). 
 
In the context of disintegrated euro area it is noticeable that several plans for dealing with 
financial crises have been agreed among the member states. This should be kept in mind when 
evaluating the ECBs working environment and tools for financial crisis situation management.  
The overarching tool is the EU-wide Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which was 
adopted in March 2003 in order to contribute to effective crisis management by ensuring a 
smooth interaction between the authorities concerned (ECB Monthly Bulletin, 2/2007). At the 
next level are regional and national memoranda of understanding, which include some 
different authorities, and are mostly concentrated on more local issues than the EU-wide 
participants. These regional committees are set up, for example, in the Nordic region and 
between Dutch and Belgium authorities.  
Table 2: Overview of the EU Framework for Financial Crisis Management 
 Authorities responsible for financial stability 
 
Central banks Banking supervisors Finance ministries 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 
Regulatory arrangements 
Financial Conglomerates Directive (FCD)1  
2005 MoU on crisis management 
2003 MoU on crisis management2 
2001 MoU on payment systems2 
 
Regional MoUs 
Voluntary cooperation 
arrangements 
National MoUs 
Central banking arrangements Eurosystem  
BSC and CEBS3 FSC3 
EU committees 
EFC3  EFC3 
Financial crisis simulation exercises Tools for practical 
implementation Development of practices by EU committees 
1The exchange of information between supervisory authorities and finance ministries regarding the regulated entities of 
financial conglomerate is subject to the sectoral rules in EU legislation for credit institutions, insurance companies and 
securities firms. 
2Regional and national memoranda of understanding (MoUs) may involve different sets of authorities including either the 
central banks or banking supervisors or both. Some Member States’ finance ministries are also party to MoUs. 
3
 BSC = Banking Supervisors Committee, CEBS = the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, FSC = the Financial 
Services Committee, EFC = the European Financial Services Committee. (This supranote was added by the author). 
source: “The EU arrangements for financial crisis management.” ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 2007. 
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The MoUs together form a broad framework for voluntary cooperation among the authorities 
responsible for financial stability. These are not legally binding, hence creating another 
disadvantage with respect to the disintegrated euro area. In a situation, as seen in the autumn 
of 2008, when financial instability hit the euro area as a whole cooperation among the 
authorities was supported by common goals to stabilize the situation. On the other hand, in a 
situation where problems arise only locally, either nationally or regionally, the authorities 
involved may not get the required support from their counterparts not having similar financial 
conditions. The further strengthening of financial regulation among the member states in the 
euro area thus plays an extremely important role in preventing serious local or regional 
financial disruptions. Solving these instabilities without the support of the common central 
bank may be an overwhelmingly difficult task, especially for smaller euro area nations. 
 
Table 2 illustrates the multi-layer system of the EU-wide financial crisis management plan. 
While local and regional authorities have important roles in crisis management, it is the 
cooperation between central banks that is the most viable aspect of preventing and solving a 
financial crisis situation, as seen in 2007-2008. There is one specific tool available for the 
euro area central banks in a crisis situation, namely the provision of emergency liquidity 
assistance (ELA) (ECB, Monthly Bulletin 2/2007). Generally, this tool enables the central 
banks to provide liquidity, under exceptional circumstances, to temporarily illiquid credit 
institutions, which cannot obtain liquidity through either the market or participation in 
monetary policy operations. The idea of this tool is quite directly comparable to the Federal 
Reserve Act’s permission to the Federal Reserve to extend credit to entities that are not 
depository institutions in “unusual and exigent circumstances” (FED, 2005). 
 
In the past, the central banks were clearly the lender of last resort for commercial banks, 
whose regular business led to, on average, having relatively illiquid assets on their balance 
sheets. In cases of lost confidence by consumers toward the commercial banks, bank runs 
were born, which led to liquidity problems, if the banks were not able to borrow. The central 
banks’ function under these credit crunches was to be available as a lender of last resort 
(Buiter & Sibert, 2007). 
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Today’s situation is quite different. Blame can be put on global integration, which has resulted 
in external finance to non-financial and financial institutions be increasingly provided through 
other alternatives than banks (Buiter & Sibert, 2007). The issuance of tradable financial 
instruments, which in many occasions have been created through securitisation and similar 
techniques, has functioned well in ‘normal times’. When the financial markets for these 
instruments unfortunately collapsed, the central banks had to play their original role in 
liquidity crises, that is, to become the lender of last resort. 
 
Figure 5: Central Banks as the Lender of Last Resort 
 
 
Figure 5 above illustrates the current problem faced by central banks regarding market 
liquidity problems. When banks were the main providers of credit, the central banks were able 
to act as the lender of last resort, if necessary. Basically, all they had to do during a crisis was 
to lend money to commercial banks against some collateral, which was impaired during bad 
times, but good and valid in ‘normal’ times. In a simplified version, as in Figure 5, this arrow 
is always an available tool against a credit crunch. But now, since the banks are not the only 
main provider of external finance anymore, the central banks, during a liquidity crisis, should 
be able to inject additional liquidity directly to the financial markets, full of assets which no-
one trusts, is able to price, or is willing to either buy or sell. The liquidity crisis, as seen today, 
is based on a complete loss of faith in securitised instruments, by the parties in the markets, 
and in counterparties behind those instruments. The central banks should find a way to return 
market participants’ trust in each other, and hence rebalance the modern way of external 
financing.  
CENTRAL 
BANK 
X 
Commercial 
Banks / 
Depository 
Institutions 
Non-bank 
Financial 
Institutions / 
Non-depository 
Institutions 
Drawn by the author 
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Theoretical evaluation of the mechanics behind the lender of last resort function will be left 
outside this paper’s focus. Rather, in chapter 4, we will evaluate some of the actions taken by 
the ECB in order to defend against the credit crunch seen in recent times. In addition to 
comparing the instruments used by the ECB to those used by the Fed, we will especially focus 
on two ways of dealing with liquidity crisis, listed by Buiter and Sibert (2007). These are 
outright purchases and sales of private sector securities and acceptance of those securities as 
collateral in repurchasing operations.  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
The central banks’ role during financial turbulences is somewhere in between being a back-up 
for the whole financial system and being a main catalyst for recreating new economic growth. 
These functions do not always go well hand in hand. Temporary short term changes in the 
economy may sometimes need a central bank reaction, but quite as often, if the central bank 
wants to maintain any longer-term stability and its own credibility and trustworthiness, some 
temporary shocks must be left unattended. 
 
Theoretically the ECB’s two-pillar framework, including the cross-checking method, does 
provide the bank with what seems like an effective way of maintaining price stability. The 
disadvantage, however, is that clearly the ECB seems to be slower in reacting to changes in 
the economic environment if the leading indicators, such as survey measures used, cannot 
anticipate sudden changes. On the other hand, the similar problem with any sudden changes 
also prompts the central banks to use a more ‘traditional’ way of concentrating on output gap 
and inflation measures. Hence, this does not fully explain why the ECB has delayed its 
interest rate level decreases. 
 
The central banks’ role in liquidity provision has turned out to be quite a difficult task during 
the recent crisis. From the ECB’s point of view, there are two basic reasons behind the 
difficulties. First, the disintegrated euro area with numerous nation states, each having their 
own distinctive problems and own fiscal policies. This limits the ECB’s possibilities to 
provide liquidity into the euro area, since several national characteristics must be analysed in 
order to maintain the necessary equality among the nation states, as stated when the common 
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monetary area was established. Similar problems do not occur if a central bank only functions 
in a single nation state. 
 
The second issue then is more global, and mainly US based, that is, the changes in financial 
system. Traditionally, depository institutions have been the main financing source for 
companies, but today their role has decreased. New financial innovations, topped by “the US 
mortgage packages”, have moved a large portion of financing responsibility to non-depository 
institutions. In the US, these non-bank institutions even overtook depository institutions as 
financing parties for US companies in 2007 (Roubini, 2008). This has then created a problem 
for the central banks, since their monetary policy tools were created in order to act as a lender 
of last resort for the depository institutions. Now, the central banks have been forced to re-
evaluate their stances on which financial instruments they should receive as collaterals against 
central bank financing. Even though this has been a larger issue for the Fed, it clearly has also 
affected the ECB’s approach. 
 
Now, the latest global financial distress has included some new characteristics, against which 
the central banks have not been prepared. Criticism has been voiced over the slow reactions 
by central banks, led by the ECB. As seen in the theoretical illustration of the ECB’s two-
pillar policy by Beck and Wieland (2006), it seems that theory partly explains why the ECB 
may have delayed its supportive and stimulating actions. Yet, it does not fully explain the 
difference to, for example, the Fed’s reactions. This, on the other hand, may be more 
supported by looking at the characteristics of the euro area, where some additional tools may 
be more difficult and slower to implement, hence giving the ECB an incentive to maintain 
some power within its interest rate setting. 
 
The next chapter will cover some of the main actions taken by the ECB and other main central 
banks since early 2007. Both interest rate setting and liquidity decisions will be included and 
possible differences analysed based on the framework seen in chapters 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  39 
4. Central Banks’ Reactions during the Financial Crisis in 2007-2008  
 
In the previous chapters some background information, necessary to better evaluate and study 
the central banks’ reactions to the latest financial crisis, were given. These reactions have 
received enormous amounts of criticism from different authorities and academics. This 
criticism also stems from several different sources. Part of this criticism may be placed under 
normal political environment, in which it is almost impossible to act ‘correctly’. There always 
exists people from other parties, who cannot accept the choices made by those in power. Yet, 
under the recent financial distress, criticism has clearly been more than only politically driven.   
  
This chapter will take a closer look at the reactions taken by the ECB. How they have acted 
regarding their interest rate setting process, their ways of supporting suddenly vanished 
liquidity, and their stimulus packages for the euro area economy. The focus here is on the 
consistency of the monetary policy, holding the two-pillar framework as a reference. Then we 
will move on to compare the main ideas and chosen actions to those from other central banks, 
mainly the Federal Reserve. Here we will evaluate whether the criticism laid down against the 
ECB that it has acted too slowly and ineffectively, is supported by our evidence.  
 
The latter part of the chapter takes a little sidestep into an interesting and important issue of 
the possible rebirth of protectionism in the global economy. There have recently been several 
warnings from academics and politicians (Brown, 2009; Earthtimes.org, 2009, et. al.), that 
central banks and governments are further pushing their own areas and countries to create new 
atmosphere of patriotism. The ECB has, during the recent past, already held growing 
protectionism as one of the most serious threats to price stability and sustainable economic 
growth. The threat of growing protectionism has also been stated in almost every editorial of 
the monthly bulletins since early 2007. This is another topic, which we will take a deeper look 
into.  
 
At the end, we will bring together the results, findings, and conclude how these may either 
further support the mistakes made by the ECB, or give positive evidence that the ECB has just 
acted based on its own plans as stated in the EC Treaty, and according to their own policy 
framework. 
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4.1 The European Central Bank 
 
 4.1.1 Interest Rate Setting 
 
First, it is relatively straightforward to evaluate how central banks have modified their 
respective key interest rates since the beginning of 2007. For the ECB this time period has 
included five decreases and three increases in the main refinancing rates. An interesting issue 
is that each lowering has been either 50 basis points, or once even 75 basis points. Table 3 
lists the changes in the key rates in the euro area, in the US, and in Great Britain since January 
2007. As the table shows, the ECB and the Bank of England have both started to decrease 
their key interest rates remarkably later than the Federal Reserve. This could result from too 
optimistic views in the euro area’s economic outlook, without fully understanding the 
spreading influence that the US-based financial crisis was going to have also in Europe. It is 
also possible and supported by findings on the history of interest rate change frequencies in 
the euro area and in the US shown later in this chapter, that the ECB has traditionally been 
less keen to quickly modify its main refinancing interest rate with respect to changes in 
economic outlook. 
 
Its main priority being in maintaining price stability, the upward pressure on future inflation in 
the euro area, seen until autumn 200817, has clearly made the ECB less willing to relax its 
monetary policy. The slow reaction concerning lowering the main refinancing interest rate, 
one criticism levelled at the ECB, should thus be seen as a consistent policy choice, based on 
the economic outlook and price stability development estimates the ECB had at the time 
decisions were made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 The editorial of the ECB’s monthly bulletin in September 2008 states that, “At the policy-relevant medium-
term horizon, taking into account the weakening in demand, upside risks to price stability have diminished 
somewhat, but they have not disappeared.” 
  41 
Table 3: Developments in Key Interest Rates by the ECB, the Fed and the BoE since 2007 
Data: Websites of the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England 
 
As can be seen, in the latter part of 2007 the ECB held its main refinancing interest rate at a 
constant 4.00%. By the end of 2008, the rate was decreased by 2.00 percentage points, 
reaching the level of 2.00%. During the same time period, the Federal Reserve’s main 
refinancing interest rate, fed funds rate, was lowered from 5.25% in August 2007 to 0.25% in 
December 2008, a decrease of a total of 5.00 percentage points. 
  
By looking Figures 6a and 6b it is clearly visible that during the last decade, although the 
main interest rates on both sides of the Atlantic have moved in quite a synchronised pattern, 
the European Central Bank’s policy has been a bit less volatile than the Fed’s. Statistically 
speaking, between January 2000 and December 2008 the ECB changed its main refinancing 
interest rate 25 times, while the fed funds rate was modified up to 40 times. So, the Fed’s 
more urgent need to adjust its key interest rate seems to be a longer-term trend. Furthermore, 
there have been 5 times during this period when the ECB has changed its interest rates in two 
consecutive months, while the Fed has implemented similar consecutive changes 19 times. 
  
The question now arises whether the economic conditions in the US have been this much 
more volatile, and hence needed more regular actions by the central bank, or whether the ECB 
has been effective enough in creating stable economic conditions in the euro area, which then 
Date of 
transaction 
ECB Main 
Refinanc. 
Int.Rate 
DoT Fed Fed 
Funds 
Rate 
DoT Bank of 
England 
Official 
Bank 
Rate 
1.1.07  3.50 1.1.07  5.25 1.1.07  5.00 
14.3.07 I-0.25 3.75 18.9.07 D-0.50 4.75 11.1.07 I-0.25 5.25 
13.6.07 I-0.25 4.00 31.10.07 D-0.25 4.50 10.5.07 I-0.25 5.50 
  4.00 11.12.07 D-0.25 4.25 5.7.07 I-0.25 5.75 
  4.00   4.25 6.12.07 D-0.25 5.50 
         
  4.00 22.1.08 D-0.75 3.50   5.50 
  4.00 30.1.08 D-0.50 3.00 7.2.08 D-0.25 5.25 
  4.00 18.3.08 D-0.75 2.25   5.25 
  4.00 30.4.08 D-0.25 2.00 10.4.08 D-0.25 5.00 
  4.00   2.00   5.00 
8.7.08 I-0.25 4.25   2.00   5.00 
8.10.08 D-0.50 3.75 8.10.08 D-0.50 1.50 8.10.08 D-0.50 4.50 
11.11.08 D-0.50 3.25 29.10.08 D-0.50 1.00 6.11.08 D-1.50 3.00 
9.12.08 D-0.75 2.50 16.12.08 D-0.75 0.25 4.12.08 D-1.00 2.00 
         
10.1.09 D-0.50 2.00   0.25 8.1.09 D-0.50 1.50 
  2.00   0.25 5.2.09 D-0.50 1.00 
10.3.09 D-0.50 1.50   0.25 5.3.09 D-0.50 0.50 
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have led the central bank to not needing to change its monetary policy too often? On the other 
hand, the central banks’ mandates could also provide a reason for this difference. Since the 
Fed is explicitly more responsible for economic growth conditions in the US, it may be forced 
to react to changes in economic conditions with less delay, and less comprehensive analysis. 
This then leads to reactions made against temporary changes, which the ECB has been able to 
avoid, resulting in fewer interest rate adjustments in the euro area compared to the US. Note 
here, that this does not mean that the Fed’s policy has been objectively better or worse than 
the ECB’s, rather the central banks’ policy framework may have created the difference.  
  
Following the main focus of the ECB’s mandate, namely the inflation rate, we should look at 
Figures 7a and 7b. These figures clearly illustrate that throughout this century the inflation 
rate in the euro area has been relatively more stable than the inflation rate in the US. In the 
euro area, the inflation rate fluctuated, on average, slightly above the ECB’s target level from 
early 2000 until late 2007. This is a clear indication, that over this time period the ECB should 
receive a relatively high grade from its actions regarding interest rate policy. This goes hand in 
hand with the earlier statement that the ECB has been able to gain high levels of 
accountability, transparency, and effectiveness of communication (Meltzer, 2008). 
Unfortunately, the latest global financial turmoil has affected the euro area with such a 
strength and suddenness that no sign of an ongoing stable inflation era is currently to be seen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6a: The ECBs Main Refinancing Interest 
Rate 1/2000 – 2/2008 
 
Figure 6b: The Fed Funds Rate 1/2000 – 
2/2008
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Figure 7a: Euro Area Inflation Rate 1/2000 – 
2/2008 
 
 
Figure 7b: The US Inflation Rate 1/2000 – 
2/2008
 
 
 
 4.1.2 Communication over Decisions 
 
The content of the editorials of the Monthly Bulletins of the European Central Bank support 
the importance of future inflation expectations behind policy decisions. For example, in June 
2007, when the ECB decided to increase its main refinancing interest rate by 25 basis points 
the statement in the editorials was, “Taking into account both short-term factors and the 
underlying trend of the continued vigorous expansion of money and credit, there are clear 
indications of upside risks to price stability at medium to longer-term horizons.” 
 
Also, in January 2008, when the fed funds rate was dramatically lowered, there was pressure 
on the ECB to follow with similar actions. At this point, the communication in the editorials 
regarding the decisions made, provide us with a good explanation for the chosen interest rate 
path. By looking at the statements in the editorial of January’s monthly bulletin regarding 
inflation expectations, one leading reason behind the decision not to decrease interest rates in 
the euro area is available. According to the ECB it is clear that, “Risks to this medium-term 
outlook for price developments are fully confirmed to lie on the upside,” and “…the period of 
temporarily high rates of inflation would be somewhat more protracted in than previously 
expected.” But, on the other hand the decision to cut any interest rates was delayed, since, 
“…assumes some reversal of the recent rises in commodity prices – in line with what is 
currently captured by futures prices – and, more fundamentally, that recent oil and food price 
dynamics and their impact on HICP inflation do not have broadly-based second-round effects 
on wage and price-setting behaviour.” These examples illustrate how strong a position 
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inflation expectations play in the ECB’s decision making process. This follows from the 
central bank’s mandate given in the EC Treaty. 
 
While both central banks have cut their respective key interest rates several times, and clearly 
below the levels seen in recent history, there are important differences in how the future 
changes have been communicated. These differences are, once again, due to the ECB’s 
primary focus on price stability versus the Fed’s more wide economic targets. The purpose of 
the interest rate cuts have mainly been in fighting a sudden drop in economic activity. The 
problem being that, just as this crisis is partly because of an era of too low interest rate levels 
leading to economic expansion and credit boom, the levels seen today could create another 
expansion period and a certain market bubble if they were maintained for too long.  
 
Since the European Central Bank is heavily responsible for maintaining price stability in a 
medium- to longer-term horizon, it has kept pointing out that it will be “flexible in the 
opposite direction by raising interest rates quickly if there is a rapid recovery in financial 
markets or if there is an upward shift in projections for future inflation” (Mishkin, 2009). The 
Fed has not a used similar mode of communication, rather it has almost purely focused on 
shorter term outlooks of economic and financial recoveries, without concentrating as heavily, 
at least explicitly, on longer-term inflation developments. The ECB has used this future threat 
of higher inflation as one explanation for its sticky lowering of the main refinancing interest 
rate, compared to the fed funds rate.   
 
 4.1.3 Maintaining Liquidity in the Market 
 
Table 4 illustrates developments in the main accounts of the ECB’s balance sheet regarding 
liquidity management. The time period covered is from the early part of 2007 until February 
2009, and the frequency is changed to shorter periods while moving closer to the present. The 
accounts included from the assets side are the main refinancing operations (MRO), longer-
term refinancing operations (LTRO), and marginal lending facility (ML). Regarding 
liabilities, current accounts (CA), deposit facility (DF), and banknotes in circulation are 
available here. All the original data is from the ECB’s own website 
(www.ecb.int/press/pr/wfs). 
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Table 4: Main Assets and Liabilities on The European Central Bank’s Balance Sheet 
ASSETS in millions of Euros LIABILITIES in millions of Euros  
Main 
Refinancing 
Operations 
(MRO) 
Longer-term 
Refinancing 
Operations(LTRO) 
Marginal 
Lending 
(ML) 
Current 
Accounts 
(CA) 
Deposit 
Facility 
(DF) 
Bank- 
notes 
13.2.09 198,383 482,335 562 247,514 75,938 740,745 
16.1.09 204,501 610,188 7,107 169,237 281,393 743,269 
12.12.08 218,560 616,131 2,669 298,543 159,161 743,506 
7.11.08 312,790 402,168 8,441 152,351 225,500 729,294 
17.10.08 311,986 447,182 14,003 230,516 239,575 721,833 
3.10.08 189,999 420,519 24,592 153,367 38,854* 693,205 
12.9.08 176,501 299,998 0 229,709 55 682,677 
8.8.08 160,000 300,021 0 211,037 88 690,348 
11.7.08 175,001 299,997 157 236,075 62 685,613 
9.5.08 150,002 295,024 14 194,841 478 673,524 
7.3.08 178,496 268,479 1 195,830 230 657,316 
11.1.08 151,500 268,487 184 180,614 665 659,395 
9.11.07 160,003 265,005 1 190,806 270 642,123 
7.9.07 256,001 190,001 279 181,548 1,029 639,169 
13.7.07 292,000 150,002 0 193,037 78 638,835 
11.5.07 276,001 149,999 145 185,937 148 623,066 
16.3.07 271,501 140,000 1 181,869 33 609,192 
* Note: Fixed-term deposits in the ECB’s balance sheet were 193,844 on 3 October 2008. Compared to 0 on 12 September and 0 on 17 
October. 
 
In normal times both the deposit facility, in which commercial banks can park excess 
liquidity, and the marginal lending facility, where banks can draw on central bank liquidity at 
a fixed-rate against sound collateral, have not played a major role. When heading towards 
autumn 2008, things here changed. Participants in the market lost their faith in the financial 
system, since they felt they could not see which banks would possibly go into bankruptcy. The 
central bank then became the only reliable source of short-term funding. 
 
The ECB answered by not only offering larger amounts through its operations, but also by 
narrowing the corridor between the marginal lending facility rate and the deposit facility rate. 
Normally, the spread here has been 200 basis points, but on October 9, 2008 the ECB halved 
this. The target here was to lower interbank money market rates, that is the rates at which the 
commercial banks lend money to each other. The central bank wants to decrease direct 
deposits and loans through its own channels, and only act as a lender of last resort. This 
should then restore enough faith for the market participants to result in the financial sector 
functioning again.  
 
One important tool used here was the ECB’s decision to loan unlimited amounts at the fixed 
rate to its accepted counter parties against sound collateral. Hence, the actual limiting factor 
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for the banks to borrow was the amount of accepted collateral they had. Here another change 
was made since the ECB widened the group of assets it accepts as collaterals. A similar 
decision was also made by the Fed.  
 
On 15 October 2008, the ECB also expanded the collateral framework, thus enhancing the 
provision of liquidity. The most significant instruments added into the list of eligible 
collaterals were,  
 1) Marketable debt instruments denominated in the US dollar, the British 
 pound and the Japanese yen 
 2) Subordinated debt instruments when they are protected by an acceptable 
 guarantee 
 3) Debt instruments issued by credit institutions, which are traded on the 
 accepted non-regulated markets.18 
 
The last addition implies especially that certificates of deposits (CDs) will also be eligible 
when traded on one of these accepted non-regulated markets. (ECB press release October 15, 
2008). 
 
All this shows that not only has the ECB used original policy tools, such as marginal lending 
and the deposit facility, but modifications to these procedures have also been made. The ECB, 
just as other central banks, has been forced to take severe and quick actions in order to support 
the vanished liquidity in the financial markets. Without contradicting the mandate given or the 
main objectives, the ECB has shown that even though the euro area is still quite disintegrated, 
the central bank itself is well organised and able to handle situations with less normal and 
predictable characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 The assessment of non-regulated markets is based on three principles: safety, transparency and accessibility. 
Full list available at: http://www.ecb.int/paym/coll/standars/marketable/html/index.en.html#acceptable  
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 4.1.4 Supporting and Stimulating the Economy 
 
Central banks, national governments, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), and many other global coordinated organisations have 
conducted numerous different common operations in order to maintain stability in the 
financial systems, as well as promote economic activities. The financial crisis in 2007 and 
2008 began from the financial system’s failures, changing relatively quickly to become a more 
or less global economic crisis. Central banks, especially the Federal Reserve and the European 
Central Bank began their cooperative liquidity providing actions as early as in December 
2007, the main focus at the time being to guarantee availability of US dollars in the banking 
system. These operations have continued throughout the crisis, as was seen regarding the euro 
area in Table 4. The central banks’ role in supporting and stimulating the economy should 
thus be seen through their liquidity injections into market liquidity and the low level of set 
interest rates. The latter is, as discussed before, a controversial issue when evaluating the 
ECB’s policy actions, while liquidity provisions are quite widely accepted policy choices of 
all central banks. 
 
Another important venue for the economic stimulus packages has been local governments, 
through their fiscal policy decisions. Here also, common global actions have been partially 
reached in different settings like the G7-countries, Financial Stability Forum, and several 
more unofficial meetings between finance ministries from the most powerful economic 
countries. As is the case with interest rate setting decisions, actions taken to support economic 
activity do not have an immediate affect, thus it is not relevant to fully evaluate the 
effectiveness of these operations quite yet. Furthermore, the evaluation of stimulus actions by 
local governments and global organizations is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, it is 
important to notice that none of the central banks’ monetary policy decisions can be made 
without also evaluating the prevailing stimulating and supporting actions. 
 
4.2 The Federal Reserve 
 
In late 2008, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke described the US central 
bank’s strategy against the ongoing financial turmoil as consisting of three components, 1) 
aggressive easing of monetary policy, 2) supporting credit markets and providing liquidity to 
the private sector, and 3) using all available tools in promoting financial stability and healthy 
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economic growth (Bernanke, 2008). Components 1 and 3 are answers to the mandate given in 
the Federal Reserve Act. The component regarding liquidity provision is far more time-
related, since under stable financial conditions it is private counterparties in the market, who 
maintain the required level of credit and liquidity. During times of financial distress, central 
banks should, and they clearly have recently, take their roles as lender of last resort, thus 
preventing the collapse of the financial system.  
 
The Federal Reserve has implemented large liquidity injections into credit markets, while 
trying to encourage them lending again. In particular, it has lowered the discount rate to just 
25 basis points above the federal funds rate, the normal difference being 100 basis points. In 
addition, the provision of liquidity has been widened well outside the Fed’s traditional trading 
partners, namely depository institutions. This can be seen as a way to serve as a lender of last 
resort in today’s new environment, where a large part of market liquidity stems from these 
non-traditional units. But just as is the case with the ECB, the Fed’s actions have not been 
explicitly in line with its written mandate. Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the Federal 
Reserve has said that the Fed’s recent actions have gone to the “very edge of its lawful and 
implied powers (Mishkin, 2009).” 
 
Of course, compared to the ECB, the Federal Reserve has been more effective, or at least 
faster, in its cooperation with the national government and Ministry of Finance. How deep the 
cooperation has gone is not directly noticeable, but it seems probable that large fiscal stimulus 
packages and monetary policy easing are conducted in common well-approved understanding. 
Whether the same has happened in the euro area is much more unclear. At least, at the 
beginning of the crisis, the ECB seems to have made its decisions without too much attention 
paid to any national level fiscal policy actions. When the crisis deepened, similar common 
fiscal actions to support and maintain economic and financial markets were necessary to 
conduct. 
 
An example is autumn 2008, when local governments and national central banks started 
increasing their guarantees over the deposits in bank accounts, hence creating a threat that the 
whole banking field in Europe will become an uneven playground. At this point, the ECB 
together with the fiscal ministries intervened by setting a common guarantee level across the 
euro area. 
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4.4 Rebirth of Protectionism 
 
“The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of open market economy with free 
competition, ensuring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with principles 
set out in article 3a”(Article 105(1) of the Treaty). In the latter part of 2008, public and 
academic discussion on the rebirth of protectionism raised its head. This included topics such 
as French car manufacturers receiving national financial support, unevenness between 
national and regional stimulus packages to financial sectors, and wider global issues like 
China’s and Russia’s protective attitudes toward their national companies. All of these are 
potential threats to efficiency in more and more globalized markets. When viewed from the 
perspective of the European Central Bank, these issues become even more serious. This is 
again related to the euro area’s characteristic of consisting of numerous autonomous national 
states. While the ECB is trying to support the euro area economy and maintain financial 
stability, some local decisions may have a negative impact on these common goals.     
 
4.4 Results 
 
The focus of this thesis being on the consistency of the European Central Bank’s policy 
actions during the recent financial turmoil, a deeper analysis of the effectiveness of chosen 
actions is beyond its scope. Yet, this perspective will provide researchers with a variety of 
fruitful targets to explore. It would be interesting to investigate if central banks have been able 
to support the lacked confidence in the world economy through their policy actions, or 
whether they have just been focused on pragmatic solutions to save the financial system by 
liquidity injections? Also, the true consequences for, for example, the cost of capital in the 
future, can only be effectively studied after some time has passed. Overall, the results of the 
reactions seen from the central banks are beyond the scope of this paper, and in any case too 
early to examine.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
The financial turbulence, which was born in 2007, has been said to be the first truly global 
crisis. This has forced the biggest central banks to be more cooperative in their efforts to fight 
the downturn. Common decisions, as seen on 8 October  2008, have shown that regardless of 
any possible differences in their mandates or main goals, all main central banks have shown 
the necessary flexibility to take part in these operations. From the European Central Bank’s 
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point of view this has not resulted in any clear significant changes in its policy framework. 
Some new or rarely used policy tools have been introduced, but the main focus on the longer-
term inflation management has remained unchanged. 
 
The slow reaction that to lowering the main refinancing interest rate, for which the ECB has 
been blamed, should thus be seen as a consistent policy choice, based on the economic 
outlook and price stability development estimates the ECB had at the time decisions were 
made. Furthermore, findings show that the Bank of England also started decreasing the 
interest rate level remarkably later than the Fed. This implies that the US born crisis did not 
arrive into Europe at the same time as the problems in the US occurred, hence the central 
banks in Europe did not have enough reason to react at that time. One could argue that this is 
only because of bad predictions regarding the severity of the crisis, and that the ECB should 
have reacted earlier. Time to evaluate this more properly comes after some years, here the 
current study only shows that the ECB has followed its main objective, namely medium- to 
longer-term price stability, as its leading indicator when making monetary policy decisions. 
 
Regarding liquidity provision issues, all central banks have been relatively quick to find and 
create effective ways to retain the market’s normal conditions. Here the ECB has also, 
regardless of the disintegrated working environment, reacted to its changed role. Moving from 
traditional lender of last resort for depository institutions, central banks have widened their 
counter parties as well as the range of acceptable collaterals assets in order to support the 
economy, which today is heavily based on non-traditional modes of financing coming through 
non-depository institutions. Even though this is a larger problem in the US than in the euro 
area, the ECB has shown flexibility in providing liquidity into suddenly dried up financial 
markets. 
 
One widely discussed question is whether the ECB could, or should, follow the Fed and the 
Bank of England in repurchasing government bonds in order to further lower interest rates and 
push up supply of money. The ECB’s policy tools do not include such an operation, although 
it has been seen that under severe conditions the ECB has also been creative and more flexible 
than perhaps expected. It thus sounds that there could be ways in which the government bond 
purchases by the central bank in the euro area can be conducted. This should probably be done 
via the local central banks, since the problems regarding this operation are related to questions 
  51 
such as which countries’ bonds should be bought, and how the pricing of these bonds would 
affect the economy of the whole area? Nonetheless, the ECB’s slow lowering of the interest 
rate level could also be because of a willingness to avoid the need to organise government 
bond purchases. Whether the ECB will end up creating this kind of policy tool is yet to be 
seen, but already findings here show that the ECB, even though limited by lack of common 
fiscal policy, seems to be sufficiently flexible even in highly difficult and exceptional 
financial conditions. 
 
The analysis in this chapter showed that the ECB’s policy decisions have followed the two-
pillar framework of the bank quite well. Even though financial conditions have suddenly 
being so heavily disrupted, the ECB has maintained its focus on medium- to longer-term price 
stability, without reacting to what have seemed to be more temporary changes in the economic 
environment. Certainly, in this kind of policy it is crucial to have enough predictability power 
to correctly evaluate how shorter-term changes will affect the longer-term conditions. The Fed 
having a mandate with more emphasis on economic growth conditions has been faster in 
reacting to the economic slowdown, and it may be that future investigations will prove the 
ECB’s to be as ineffective and slow compared to the Fed’s, but at this point, and within the 
scope of this paper, the conclusion remains that the ECB has acted close to its mandate and 
targeted its main goals. 
 
The next chapter will provide a short empirical testing of the consistency of the European 
Central Bank’s interest rate setting policy during the recent financial turmoil. This should 
further provide us with evidence on whether the ECB’s policy approach has truly followed the 
constructed framework, and targeted the given objectives. 
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5. Empirical Section 
 
5.1 General 
 
This chapter provides empirical tests to further evaluate the consistency of the ECB’s policy. 
The empirical part is loosely based on a paper by Gerlach (2004). The idea is to estimate 
empirical reaction functions for the ECB with the ordered-probit technique. Variables such 
that relate to the ECB Monthly Bulletins are chosen. In addition to regular quantitative 
variables such as the expected and underlying inflation rates or the growth of money 
aggregates other indicator variables have also been constructed. This follows Gerlach’s idea 
(2004). These variables are explained further below. Results are analysed by concentrating on 
possible differences between the periods from 2000 until June 2006, and since June 2006. 
 
Besides testing the empirical reaction functions, this part also takes into account the wording 
in the editorials of the ECB Monthly Bulletins. Following Gerlach’s idea, this evaluates how 
temporary or permanent the ECB has seen changes in economic variables, and how these 
assessments may have affected interest rate setting. These assessments will be studied by 
constructing quantitative indicators based on the wording in the ECB Monthly Bulletins. The 
indicators will include opinions over inflation, output and money growth developments. 
Correlations will be studied to see how well these indicators and related macroeconomic 
variables, which were used in the reaction functions, follow each other. By comparing the 
correlations from years 2000-2006, to those seen since mid-2006, we can evaluate whether the 
ECB has seriously misjudged developments in monetary aggregates and inflation as well as in 
economic growth. This again will identify any inconsistencies in the ECB’s policy framework, 
or will indicate whether the actions are more based on a lack of correct estimations.     
 
5.2 Data 
 
All the following analysis is based on the data from the ECB’s web site, unless otherwise 
stated. Also, the data is chosen such that it would be similar to the one used in the paper by 
Gerlach (2004). 
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 5.2.1 Inflation 
 
The main focus of the central banks in the euro area, led by the ECB, should be in maintaining 
price stability. For the reaction functions three different inflation-related variables are chosen. 
One is for the expected future inflation, while the remaining two focus on available core and 
headline inflation data. Even though core inflation is never mentioned in the editorials of the 
ECB Monthly Bulletins, there are frequent references to a measure of inflation that excludes 
fresh-food and energy prices. Hence both headline and core inflation measures can justifiably 
be taken into account here. Following again Gerlach’s (2004) idea, headline inflation and 
expected inflation will be used with a one-month lag, while core inflation, which is a more 
revised indicator, will be used with a two-month lag. 
 
The expected inflation variable is conducted from the Economist’s future inflation expectation 
surveys. Gerlach (2004) is followed in this current study by computing the variable as a 
weighted average of the forecasts for two consecutive years. The Economist publishes forecast 
surveys made by a number of financial institutions over the inflation and real output growth 
for this and the next year. They are published on a monthly basis. The weighted average for 
the variable used here is calculated with the weights depending on the month in which the 
forecasts are made. For example, the expected rate of inflation in May is computed as 7/12 of 
the expected rate of inflation for this year and 5/12 of the expected rate of inflation for next 
year. 
 
 5.2.2 State of the Economy 
 
Data for the state of the economy chosen differs somewhat from that used by Gerlach (2004).  
The editorials never refer to output gap, furthermore Gerlach did not find this variable 
significant in any reaction function tested. In addition, output gap is only measured with a 
relatively long time lag, and its calculation is often a highly argued process. With all these 
arguments, output gap has been left out of this paper’s analysis.  
 
Two variables chosen for the state of the economy are the ones often covered in the editorials 
of the Monthly Bulletins, namely the sentiment for the economic outlook, and a measure of 
expected real GDP growth rate. The latter is calculated based on the same approach and 
average weighting as discussed with the measure of expected inflation, using the same survey 
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data from the Economist. The sentiment indicator is developed by the European Commission 
as a subjective indicator of real economic activity.19  
 
For the purpose of the ECB it would make good sense to follow these two subjective 
indicators if they are found to correlate with real output growth in a relatively constant time 
gap. For the purpose of monetary policy decisions, these indicators would then provide good 
approximates for future real economic activity. This would enable the central bank to react in 
a more timely manner to upcoming changes in economic activity, thus it would further 
strengthen a proactive monetary policy approach. Since these indicators are relatively quickly 
available to decision makers, a one-month lag will be used with them. 
 
By testing the correlations between the subjective economic growth indicators and the real 
GDP growth it becomes clear that the expected economic growth variable provides a good 
approximation for the future outlook. The GDP data in the euro area is mostly in quarterly 
form, thus for the correlation the first month’s figure in every month is used for the expected 
growth variable. With a one-quarter lag, the correlation between these two is 0.861. This, in 
addition to all the existing problems, provides further support for excluding the output gap 
from the analysis. 
 
 5.2.3 M3 Growth  
 
The essential role of monetary aggregates given by the European Central Bank in its policy 
framework, strengthens the importance of the M3 growth variable. The ECB’s preferred 
measure of money growth is a three-month centered moving average, and as it is available 
with a two-month lag, a similar lag will be used for the reaction functions.  
  
 5.2.4 Exchange Rate 
  
The exchange rate change variable used is the percentage change over twelve months in the 
nominal effective rate of the euro against a basket of 12 main trading partners’ currencies.20 A 
one-month lagging period will be used for this variable. Although the exchange rates are 
                                                          
19
 The economic sentiment index is based on a large survey of firms and consumers in the euro area. For more 
information, see http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/business_consumer_surveys/userguide_en.pdf. 
20
 Namely these currencies are Australian, Canadian, Singapore, the US and Hong Kong dollars, Danish, Swedish 
and Norwegian krones, Swiss franc, Japanese yen, Pound sterling, and South Korean won. 
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available timely, it is more appropriate to use a short lag with the reaction functions, since 
many other related factors studied by monetary policy makers, for example foreign imports 
and exports, are not available with similar frequencies. This is also in line with Gerlach 
(2004). 
  
5.3 Model and Results 
 
There are numerous authors who have studied the interest-rate-setting behaviour of the 
European Central Bank by estimating empirical reaction functions.21 The aim here, based on 
Gerlach (2004), is to include some variables, which bring some insight into how the ECB 
interprets incoming macroeconomic data. This is to provide a more accurate picture behind 
the recent interest rate setting choices, which have been accused of being too mild and slow. 
As Gerlach (2004) puts it: “Estimates of reaction functions in which policy-controlled interest 
rates are regressed on macroeconomic variables disregard the fact that policymakers’ 
assessment of these variables may vary over time.” 
 
These different assessments will be looked at in the next section. First, the change in the 
ECB’s main refinancing interest rate is estimated by using the ordered-probit technique. Again 
in line with Gerlach (2004), an ordered-response model that shows the significance of 
different variables in the ECB’s policy reactions will be constituted. These models are 
constructed with different sets of variables, and similar tests are conducted in three different 
time periods, namely since January 200022, between January 2000 and July 2006, and lastly 
since June 2006 until February 2009. The last period illustrates the period of recent financial 
turmoil. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 below show the results from conducting ordered-probit estimates from six 
reaction functions, including different sets of explanatory variables, all explaining whether 
there has been a change in the main refinancing interest rate, or not. Rather than commenting 
on, or interpreting the regressions individually, the focus will be on a more widespread 
analysis. This is to say that we are interested in identifying any significant differences between 
the periods. It is also useful to use Gerlach’s (2004) results as another source of comparison. 
                                                          
21
 Some examples of recent literature estimating reaction functions are Berger, de Haan and Sturm (2006) and 
Carstensen (2006). 
22
 Results of this period are found in appendix 2. 
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His results were based on data from February 1999 to June 2006. These showed that the 
ECB’s policy reacts to the state of the real economy, M3 growth, and exchange rate changes, 
but not to inflation. Based on this paper’s earlier sections, it would seem reasonable to expect 
that the recent policy may still have reacted to the same variables, hence being relatively 
consistent, and the reasons for the criticism seen is more based on the ability of these variables 
to keep up with sudden changes in overall economic conditions.  
  
Table 5: Ordered-Probit Estimates of Reaction Function: June 2006- February 2009 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Sentiment 0.4141*** 
(2.59) 
0.4069*** 
(2.64) 
0.473*** 
(2.82) 
   
Expected Growth    7.447* 
(1.83) 
4.724** 
(2.25) 
5.560** 
(2.04) 
Headline Inflation -1.995 
(-0.29) 
 
 
 -4.094 
(-1.44) 
  
Core Inflation  -2.156 
(-0.89) 
  -0.727 
(-0.21) 
 
Expected Inflation   1.761 
(0.89) 
  2.841 
(0.90) 
M3 Growth -0.920 
(-1.57) 
-0.7037 
(-1.19) 
-0.4066 
(-0.53) 
-2.296 
(-1.35) 
0.023 
(0.04) 
0.790 
(0.76) 
Exchange Rate 30.629 
(1.61) 
22.820 
(1.53) 
18.57 
(1.12) 
205.15* 
(1.73) 
81.69** 
(2.17) 
85.52** 
(1.97) 
Lagged Change in Repo Rate -0.649 
(-0.98) 
-0.7218 
(-1.08) 
-0.645 
(-0.96) 
-4.726 
(-1.60) 
-2.320** 
(-1.86) 
-3.04* 
(-1.73) 
Lagged Level of Repo Rate -3.682*** 
(-2.59) 
-3.359** 
(-2.45) 
-4.914*** 
(-2.77) 
-5.098 
(-1.45) 
-5.809* 
(-2.16) 
-8.883* 
(-1.82) 
Pseudo-R2 0.4454 0.4585 0.4588 0.714 0.5998 0.6150 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parantheses.*, **, and *** denote significance at the 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
During the recent financial crisis, it seems that the ECB’s policy has clearly reacted to the 
state of the real economy, as seen through the sentiment survey index and expected growth 
estimates. Similar results were found by Gerlach (2004). Expected growth was an even more 
significant variable in his study, but this could also be explained by relatively short time 
period used here. 
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Inflation, even though being the main responsibility of the ECB, does not appear to have any 
significance on policy reactions. This is in line with the findings by Gerlach (2004). Lagged 
level of the main refinancing interest rate being a significant variable also supports the earlier 
results. Lagged change in the policy rate can be left outside a deeper analysis because of the 
short estimation period used. Similar limitation relates to the exchange rate change variable. 
 
The monetary growth variable, namely the M3 growth rate does not seem to be significant in 
our reaction function. Yet it was highly significant in all reaction functions tested by Gerlach. 
The short time period may also affect this variable, but it also seems reasonable to claim that 
it supports the earlier findings that during the recent crisis, the ECB has not been quite as 
worried about monetary growth as previously. Thus, it appears as if the ECB’s policy has not 
reacted to this variable. Furthermore, it looks like the variable used here may not accurately 
reflect the ECB’s stance of how it analyses future money growth as a guideline to future price 
stability. This is the first indication that the ECB’s monetary policy may have not been fully 
consistent over recent times. 
 
Table 6: Ordered-Probit Estimates of Reaction Function: January 2000- June 2006 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Sentiment 0.209** 
(2.04) 
0.1847* 
(1.83) 
0.2738** 
(2.33) 
   
Expected Growth    3.02*** 
(2.63) 
3.583*** 
(2.88) 
4.383** 
(2.52) 
Headline Inflation -2.195** 
(-2.26) 
  -0.983 
(-0.98) 
  
Core Inflation  -0.433 
(-0.45) 
  -0.552 
(-0.49) 
 
Expected Inflation   -6.164*** 
(-2.60) 
  -4.506* 
(-1.91) 
M3 Growth 0.0756 
(0.20) 
0.0654 
(0.19) 
-0.580 
(1.09) 
0.195 
(0.54) 
0.190 
(0.50) 
-0.322 
(0.86) 
Exchange Rate -50.099*** 
(-3.37) 
-37.78*** 
(-3.69) 
-57.35*** 
(-3.10) 
-46.02*** 
(-3.06) 
-43.94*** 
(-3.03) 
-56.64*** 
(-2.67) 
Lagged Change in Repo Rate -1.951** 
(-2.55) 
-1.180** 
(-2.02) 
-2.697** 
(-2.55) 
-2.057** 
(-2.37) 
-1.782** 
(-2.32) 
-3.275** 
(-2.18) 
Lagged Level of Repo Rate -1.815* 
(-1.88) 
-1.359* 
(-1.86) 
-1.042 
(-1.04) 
-3.921** 
(-2.43) 
-3.981** 
(-2.46) 
-4.551** 
(-2.19) 
Pseudo-R2 0.6152 0.5541 0.6609 0.6596 0.6520 0.7052 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parantheses.*, **, and *** denote significance at the 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6 shows the results from the empirical reaction functions as seen in Table 5, but now 
the time period is January 2000-June 2006. Since the focus here is on the consistency of the 
ECB’s policy it is interesting to compare the significant variables in Tables 5 and 6. As stated 
before and reflected in the paper by Gerlach (2004), monetary growth has become a less 
significant factor, while the remaining results support the consistency of the ECB’s policy. 
 
By looking at Table 6 it is interesting to notice that in a few models inflation measures 
become slightly significant variables. This further supports the idea that the recent policy 
actions have been less related to inflation levels, hence evidencing that the ECB was already 
in 2007 able to correctly predict that the relatively high inflation level at the time, was mostly 
due of short-term fluctuations. Temporary changes were then seen as not needing any 
remarkable interest rate increases.  
 
The question whether the last interpretation over policy rate and inflation variables shows that 
the ECB’s interest rate setting policy has changed during the recent times can be evaluated 
from two different points of views. First, one could argue that yes, the ECB is today much less 
concerned about future inflation, while heavily focusing on economic growth. On the other 
hand, one could evaluate the situation being such that the ECB, since it focuses on the 
medium- to longer-term perspective, estimates today that inflation indicators are currently so 
heavily affected by the temporary effects, and that over the policy-related medium term, they 
do not show any significant sign of inflation pressure, which should be fought against with 
interest rate settings. This is to say that the has remained unchanged, but the current situation 
has changed the context of the variables used in our models in such a way that they do not 
estimate future longer-term inflation as effectively as they have previously.  
 
Overall, the results here illustrate the difficulties of trying to evaluate the European Central 
Bank’s interest rate setting process. Clear indications that the interest rate setting policy has 
changed dramatically during the recent crisis are not available. Yet, it becomes an interesting 
question whether the ECB has been forced to change, or to add new economic and monetary 
variables in its research methods, because of sudden changes in economic and financial 
conditions. These changes have certainly had some effect on interrelateness between the 
variables, thus influencing the overall process of interest rate setting. Theoretically it is 
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perhaps easy to claim that first the central bank must find correct variables and indicators, and 
then it must be able to evaluate existing changes, thus creating correct divisions between 
shorter-term and more policy-related medium- to longer-term influences. Certainly the ECB’s 
analyses behind its policy framework are deep and thorough, as seen earlier. Yet, it initially 
seems that in a situation as seen during 2007, when economic conditions change dramatically 
and very suddenly, it is quite natural that any central bank focused heavily on maintaining 
certain financial and economic stability can be rather slow to react to such changes.   
 
5.4 Indicators and Economic Conditions 
  
In order to further study the connection between how the ECB has seen the economic 
developments since mid-2006 and how well its estimates have been able to predict historically 
sudden changes, information from the editorials of the ECB Monthly Bulletins is used. In line 
with Gerlach’s (2004) paper, three indicator variables have been constructed for the ECB’s 
interpretation of future outlook. These variables include future inflation pressure, 
developments in real economic activity, and M3 growth. The construction follows the similar 
coding and idea as in the paper by Gerlach (2004), but yet, because of subjective interpretation 
of the wording in the editorials, cautious needs to be exercised when drawing conclusions 
from the results.23 Anyhow, if the ECB’s interest rate setting policy is to be relatively 
consistent, as our previous studies have shown, the results found here should be relatively 
close to those found by Gerlach (2004).  
 
This part has been restricted to include only a simple study of correlations between the 
constructed indicator variables and real variables related to them. These real variables follow 
the ones used in the earlier ordered-probit tests. Even with this, we should be able to evaluate 
whether economic conditions have recently changed so that the ECB’s future forecast, as 
stated in the monthly bulletins, have become seriously misguided. Note, that for the purpose 
of this paper a problem arises from having a relatively short time period under examination, 
hence the reliability of correlations becomes lower. Yet, by understanding this limitation some 
conclusions can still be drawn and further support, or counter facts, to the paper’s earlier 
sections found. 
                                                          
23
 Appendix 1 illustrates part of the texts from which the indicator variables are constructed. It should be noticed 
that these are only short quotes and that the coding of the indicator variables has been made on the basis of the 
full editorials.  
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5.4.1 Inflation Indicator 
 
The European Central Bank’s main responsibility being price stability in the euro area, it 
becomes obvious that the wording in the ECB Monthly Bulletins regarding the future inflation 
outlook needs to be carefully studied. Table 8 shows the correlations between the indicator 
and the HICP. With the HICP a two-month lag is used, since this lag provides the best 
correlation between these two variables when testing with all available data24. No clear 
correlation was found with core inflation, perhaps illustrating that even though core inflation 
seems important regarding price stability, it remains in the background in the ECB’s economic 
analysis, since the explicit target is defined in terms of HICP. 
 
The results indicate that, at least regarding inflation, the ECB has shown relatively efficient 
forecasting power. Yet, with such a dramatic change as seen here, it could be that even the 
two-month lag has been too long for effective reactions, resulting in the criticism received. 
Note also that since indicator values are based partly on Gerlach’s (2004) paper and partly 
constructed by the author the comparisons between different time periods must be looked at 
with exceptional carefulness. Still, it would seem that between 2000 and 2006, when the 
HICP level actually stayed more stable than during the recent two years, the indicator 
variables do not provide an accurate picture of inflation development. This results mainly 
from the indicator values’ discrete and quite rough characteristics.     
 
Table 7: Inflation Indicator and Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices 
 Inflation Indicator  Inflation Indicator  
 January 2000-June 2006 June 2006-February 2009 
HICP -0.0612 0.6826 
 
 
5.4.2 Output Indicator 
 
The economic analysis part of the two-pillar framework provides the ECB with plentiful 
material in order to evaluate future economic outlook. The economic outlook indicator 
constructed here describes how these future estimations are stated in the editorials of the 
Monthly Bulletins. To compare this indicator to real GDP growth, correlation between the 
indicator values and the real GDP growth in the euro area is calculated. Since GDP growth 
                                                          
24
 Using a two-month lag with the inflation indicator variable gives a correlation 0.3241 with the HICP. This is 
the highest correlation within any reasonable lags. 
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values are most often published quarterly, similar data is used here. The indicator values are 
then used by always taking the first month of every quarter.   
 
Calculating the correlation with a one-quarter lag gives a value of 0.795 between the output 
indicator and GDP growth since the first quarter of 2000. This high correlation reveals that at 
least over the recent decade the ECB seems to have predicted development in the euro area’s 
economic growth relatively accurately. For maintaining price stability, as the ECB is 
mandated, proper estimates for future economic conditions are necessary. High correlation 
supports the earlier parts of this paper regarding the ECB’s careful and widespread analyses 
inside its two-pillar framework. 
 
The same correlation is 0.797 when restricting the time period to the era of this recent crisis 
― namely, since the second quarter of 2006. This shows that based on these calculations there 
has not been a serious decrease in efficiency regarding the ECB’s economic outlook 
predictions. Yet, it should be noted that since almost all economic variables have seen 
dramatic and extremely sudden changes, the central bank’s ability to predict future 
development in a quarterly-manner has not been adequate enough. Regarding the recent 
criticism, the central bank should somehow have improved its estimations, even though times 
of turmoil are naturally the most difficult periods for any estimators, since, after all, 
estimations are only one form of probability calculations.25  
 
 5.4.3 Money-Growth Indicator 
 
The editorials of the ECB Monthly Bulletins always include a careful and thorough analysis of 
monetary growth. Future expectations, current numbers and possible changes in different 
monetary components are all discussed. With this analysis being so thorough, it seems 
reasonable to say that even though the simple statistical test does not provide too high a 
correlation between the money-growth indicator and real M3 growth, this component plays, 
and has played, an important role in the ECB’s monetary policy decisions.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 The sentence is the author’s version of Pasi Sorjonen’s, ETLA’s head of forecasting, statement on the Finnish 
National Television news during the financial crisis. 
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Table 8: Money-Growth Indicator and M3 Growth Measure 
 Money-Growth Indicator  Money-Growth Indicator  
 January 2000-June 2006 June 2006-February 2009 
M3 Growth -0.2619 0.3931 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
Empirical testing of the central banks’ interest rate setting reaction functions is a widely 
studied topic regarding central bank policies. In line with the scope of this paper in studying 
the consistency of the European Central Bank’s policy within its two-pillar framework, the 
empirical support for the earlier findings were looked at via some ordered-probit testing. In 
addition, a quick look at the wording of the ECB’s economic and monetary outlook in its 
Monthly Bulletins was also included in the analysis. Gerlach’s (2004) paper on similar issues 
was held as a reference study. However, this paper’s analysis was limited so that it does not 
fully follow Gerlach’s paper. 
 
The findings from testing several models of the reaction function, by studying which variables 
seem to be significant factors in the ECB’s interest rate setting behaviour provided quite 
similar results as found by Gerlach (2004) from time the period 2000-2006. Interestingly, even 
though the ECB is close to being an inflation targeting central bank, with its HICP target 
level, inflation measures do not show up as significant factors in any model. This implies that 
it is not inflation itself, rather the reasons behind it, that the ECB is trying to affect. 
 
The monetary growth variable also remains insignificant, or at least its role is relatively 
unclear. This, on the other hand, further strengthens our earlier findings that during the recent 
turmoil, it has not been so much the actual growth in the M3 aggregate, but more what has 
been happening inside monetary aggregates that have been impacting factors. Changes in 
monetary and credit variables have been closely followed and mentioned in the ECB’s 
explanations over the decided policy actions. Yet, the role of the M3 growth level cannot 
easily be left outside the analysis, since the ECB still has a reference value regarding this 
variable. 
 
One clear factor influencing future inflation level is economic growth. The real measures of 
economic activity are often received with too long a lag in order for them to be relevant in 
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policy decisions. Hence, it is really positive, from the ECB’s point of view, to notice that 
some survey measures, which are available even a few months earlier than the actual data, 
give good estimates of future economic growth. Economic outlook variables are found to be 
significant, many times even highly significant, in the reaction functions.  
 
The focus on economic outlook in policy decisions supports the idea that the ECB tries to be 
proactive regarding its price stability mandate. When testing the wording in the editorials of 
the ECB Monthly Bulletins, it also becomes clear that during the recent financial crisis the 
ECB has been able to predict future changes relatively accurately. Certainly, the magnitude of 
the changes has surprised even the ECB, which has then probably deciding on too moderate 
policy actions. Also, the pace of the crisis has been so extraordinary, that part of the problem 
possibly comes through the analysis tools, which just have not been able to keep up. This 
would then lead a central bank to act based on its own targets and framework, but 
unfortunately, because of inadequate information received, too little and too late. This 
provides us with some explanation of why some of the criticism shown may have been well 
justified.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  64 
6. Conclusions  
 
This paper’s goal was to study the European Central Bank’s role in the recent global financial 
crisis in the context of the two-pillar framework. The ECB’s policy is built on this framework. 
The main objective was to evaluate the consistency of the ECB’s monetary policy during this 
exceptional time period. This consistency was reflected in the ECB’s mandate, legal 
responsibilities and, most of all, its two-pillar framework. The paper does not consider 
whether the ECB, or any other central bank, has reacted effectively, correctly or clearly better 
than another. The time for this type of study is later, when all consequences, costs and benefits 
from this global economic downturn have been seen. 
 
The European Central Bank’s history is relatively short, and its responsibilities regarding a 
financial distress situation, as recently seen, are still relatively unclear. Furthermore, the 
ECB’s biggest limiting factor is its own working environment, meaning that being a common 
central bank in an area including very diversified nation states is not a simple task. The ECB 
is responsible for maintaining price stability and related stable economic conditions in the 
whole euro area. By focusing too heavily on only the largest countries in the area, the majority 
of nations could actually see their situation deteriorating further. Yet, focusing too much on a 
general level, may easily lead to mediocre actions, and in some cases, even prevent overall 
well being to grow at its optimal level. This limitation has affected the ECB’s actions 
throughout its history. 
 
In maintaining price stability in the euro area, the ECB gained a high and appreciated 
reputation during the past 10 years. The ECB’s two-pillar framework does lead to a stable 
economic and monetary environment, which has been studied as a precondition for 
sustainable economic growth. The downside for the policy framework has seemed to be that 
the ECB’s monetary policy cannot provide enough financial first-aid support if a global crisis 
occurs. The Federal Reserve, who is more focused on maintaining economic growth, has more 
flexibility regarding situations where proactive policy actions are required. During the recent 
financial chaos, both leading central banks have shown greater flexibility and innovativeness 
regarding supportive policy actions. In this, no significance differences between the central 
banks are noticeable. 
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The theoretical model developed by Beck and Wieland (2007) further supports the findings, 
which showed that the ECB’s policy framework may not provide enough room for proactive 
policy implementation during a sudden economic crisis. The model explains some of the 
reasons why the ECB has been able to create relatively stable monetary conditions in the euro 
area. Yet, even the theoretical model does not say that all the criticism against the ECB’s slow 
reactions can be attributed to the two-pillar framework. Rather, the disintegrated euro area 
again seems to cause numerous problems. 
 
The ECB has received a lot of criticism over interest rate setting policy. The refinancing 
interest rate in the euro area has been claimed to be too high for too long, thus increasing the 
influence of the global crisis. This study supports the idea that the ECB, by following its own 
framework has lowered the interest level slower than it actually might have done without 
threatening price stability. On the other hand, the consistency of the ECB’s policy has stayed. 
Unfortunately, when the economic and monetary analysis behind the policy framework has 
not been able to correctly estimate the great pace by which the global economy and financial 
markets have changed since the mid-2007, the consistency of the policy has led the ECB’s 
actions to be, at least partly, too late. 
 
Besides lowering interest rate levels, central banks worldwide have been forced to fight 
against the suddenly lost liquidity in the markets. In these liquidity injections, the ECB has not 
been remarkably different than any other major central bank. The current problems regarding 
this task are mainly created by changes in financial markets. Previously, depository 
institutions have been the main financing institutions for companies, and central banks the 
lender of last resort for depository institutions. To act as a lender of last resort has been a 
relatively straightforward task for all central banks. 
 
New financial innovations have resulted in companies’ external financing coming from 
sources other than traditional depository institutions. Central banks have faced a question of 
how to support liquidity through different non-depository institutions, which are not regular 
counter parties in central bank actions. There have been changes in collateral accepted when 
borrowing money from the central bank. Also, the range of accepted counter parties has been 
increased. With this the central banks have been forced to stretch their normal procedures, 
thus employing tools, which are not normally allowed to them. The latest financial crisis being 
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so critical and severe, there does not seem to be too many critical opinions over these extreme 
actions. Since financing through non-depository institutions has become more common in the 
US than in the euro area, the Fed has been much more urgent in using all extreme tools than 
has the ECB. 
 
The short empirical section in this paper, loosely following the idea of Gerlach (2004), further 
supported the earlier findings regarding interest rate setting decisions by the ECB. This is to 
say, that the consistency with respect to the two-pillar framework is clearly visible. The ECB 
has reacted to changes in the real economic conditions as it has throughout the last decade. 
Yet, this also points out that the biggest reasons for all the criticism laid against the ECB’s 
actions may be because of the characteristics of the recent crisis.  
 
The global financial turmoil has been characterised by extremely sudden changes in most of 
the important economic indicators. Since the two-pillar framework is based on a deep and 
thorough economic and monetary analysis, these are needed to be accurate in order for the 
central bank to react correctly. Now, the ECB following its own strategy has not been able to 
react fast enough to all these changes, because everything has happened faster than prediction 
models have been able to forecast. The way the ECB reacts to different indicators has not 
significantly changed, hence it is valid to claim that the policy has remained relatively 
consistent. 
 
Overall, the ECB has not provided the markets with any significantly different solution to the 
recent crisis, than has any other major central bank. Yet, the ECB has maintained a clear 
connection to its mandate and its created policy framework. The disintegrated euro area still 
limits the ECB’s actions in a way that could make them appear rather slow and inefficient 
compared to the Fed. The responsibility over each nation state’s monetary policy, together 
with local fiscal policy actions has decreased the ECB’s possibilities to conduct truly 
proactive decisions. Also, the recent crisis has been characterised by such sudden changes that 
it seems quite natural that neither of the major central banks has managed without being 
heavily criticised. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Summary of the Editorials in the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, January 2007-February 2009 
Monthly Bulletin, Dates of 
Meetings, and Interest Rate 
Decisions 
Outlook for Prices Outlook for Real Activity Outlook for Monetary 
Development 
January 2007 
- 11.1.2007 
- no change (the minimum bid rate of 
the main refinancing operations = 3.5%) 
 
(1,1,1. Values given to outlook for 
prices, real activity, and monetary 
development, respectively) 
“In the Governing Council’s view, the 
outlook for price developments remains 
subject to upside risks” 
“Drawing on the latest information, the 
evidence from various confidence 
surveys and indicator-based estimates 
supports the assessment that robust 
economic growth has continued and that 
the situation in labour markets has 
improved further”.  
“…annual M3 growth rose to 9.3% in 
November. This represents its highest 
annual rate of growth since the 
introduction of the euro” 
“All in all, the rate of monetary and 
expansion remains rapid”. 
February 2007 
 - 8.2.2007 
- no change 
 
(1,1,1) 
 
 
“The medium to longer-term outlook for 
price stability remains subject to upside 
risks”. 
“More fundamentally, stronger than 
currently expected wage developments 
pose substantial upward risks to price 
stability” 
“Conditions remain in place for the euro 
area economy to continue to expand at 
rates around potential”. 
“However, continued strong money and 
credit growth confirm the view that the 
underlying rate of broad money 
expansion in the euro area remains 
vigorous”. 
March 2007 
- 8.3.2007 
- raise by 25 basis points to 3.75% 
 
(1,1,1) 
 
 
“At the policy-relevant medium-term 
horizon, the outlook for price 
developments remains, in the Governing 
Council’s view, subject to upside risk” 
“The strength of real GDP growth in the 
fourth quarter is thus indicative of 
ongoing robust growth in the euro area”. 
“…various confidence surveys and 
indicator-based estimates supports the 
assessment that robust economic growth 
has continued into 2007” 
“Taking the appropriate medium to 
longer-term perspective… …,the latest 
developments confirm the continuation 
of a persistent upward trend in the 
underlying rate of monetary expansion.” 
April 2007 
- 12.4.2007 
- no change 
 
(1,0,1) 
 
“Over the policy-relevant medium-term 
horizon, the outlook for price 
developments remains subject to upside 
risks.” 
“Looking further ahead, the conditions 
are in place for the euro area economy to 
grow solidly.” 
“The risks surrounding this favourable 
outlook for economic growth are broadly 
balanced over the shorter term. At longer 
horizons, downside risks remain.” 
“The continued robust expansion of 
money and credit…” 
“In this environment of ample liquidity, 
the continued vigorous expansion of 
money and credit…” 
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May 2007 
- 10.5.2007 
- no change 
 
(1,1,1) 
 
 
“Over the policy-relevant medium-term 
horizon, the outlook for price 
developments remains subject to upside 
risks.” 
“…stronger than currently expected 
wage developments could pose 
significant upward risks to price .” 
“The medium-term outlook for economic 
growth in the euro area continues to be 
favourable.” 
“At longer horizons, the balance of risks 
remains on the downside,…” 
“The underlying rate of monetary 
expansion remains strong, in a context of 
already ample liquidity.” 
“…in the increasingly rapid growth of 
M3…” 
June 2007 
- 6.6.2007 
- raise by 25 basis points to 4.00% 
 
(1,1,1) 
 
 
 
 
“At the policy-relevant medium-term 
horizon, risks to outlook for price 
stability remain on the upside…” 
“…there is a risk that wage 
developments will be stronger than 
expected, which would pose significant 
upward risks to price stability.” 
“…, incoming information clearly 
confirms that the euro area economy 
continues to expand at a pace which is 
significantly stronger than generally 
expected a year ago.” 
“Looking ahead, the medium-term 
outlook for economic activity remains 
favourable.” 
“The underlying rate of monetary 
expansion remains strong, in a context of 
already ample liquidity.” 
“The strong rate of monetary and credit 
expansion reflects…” 
July 2007 
- 5.7.2007 
- no change 
 
(1,0,1) 
 
 
“At the policy-relevant medium-term 
horizon risks to the outlook for price 
stability remain on the upside.” 
“In addition, upside risks to price 
stability arise from increases in 
administered prices and indirect taxes 
beyond those anticipated thus far,…” 
“The medium-term outlook for economic 
activity remains favourable.” 
“At medium to longer horizons, the 
balance of risks remains on the 
downside.” 
“The underlying rate of monetary 
expansion remains strong in a context of 
already ample liquidity.” 
August 2007 
- 2.8.2007 
- no change 
 
(1,0,1) 
 
 
 
 
“At the policy-relevant medium-term 
horizons, risks to the outlook for price 
stability remain on the upside.” 
“Given the continued vigour of money 
and credit expansion, there are clear 
indications of upside risks to price 
stability at medium to longer-term.” 
“the medium-term outlook for economic 
growth remains favourable, conditions 
are in place for economic activity in the 
euro area to continue expand at a 
sustained rate.” 
“At medium to longer horizons, the 
balance of risks remains on the 
downside, owing mainly to external 
factors.” 
“The ongoing strength of monetary 
expansion is reflected in the in the 
continued robust growth in M3, which 
increased at an annual rate of 10.9% in 
June 2007.” 
September 2007 
- 6.9.2007 
- no change 
 
(1,0,1) 
 
“The Governing Council is of the view 
that risks to this outlook for price 
developments lie on the upside.” 
“the data available suggest that economic 
activity in the euro area is continuing to 
expand at sustained rate.” 
“Data on activity……remain favourable 
overall and support the assessment that 
real GDP is growing at sustained rate.” 
“the underlying rate of monetary and 
credit expansion remains strong.” 
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October 2007 
- 4.10.2007 
- no change 
 
(1,0,1) 
“Risks to the outlook for price 
developments remain on the upside.” 
“…, it appears that the sustained 
economic growth experienced in the euro 
area in the first half of 2007 has 
continued through the summer.”  
“A broad assessment of monetary data 
supports the view that the underlying rate 
of money and credit growth remains 
strong.” 
November 2007 
- 8.11.2007 
- no change 
 
(2,1,1) 
 
 
 
“Risks to the medium-term outlook for 
price developments are fully confirmed 
to lie on the upside.” 
“…, it appears that the sustained 
economic growth experienced in the euro 
area in the first half of 2007 has 
continued through the third quarter, …” 
“…, these indicators generally remain 
above their historical averages and 
continue to point to ongoing sustained 
growth.” 
“…, even taking into account these 
special factors, the underlying rate of 
money and credit expansion remains 
strong.” 
December 2007 
- 6.12.2007 
- no change 
 
(2,0,1) 
 
 
 
 
“…, risks to this medium-term outlook 
for price developments are fully 
confirmed to lie on the upside.” 
“The latest information on economic 
activity from various confidence surveys 
and indicator-based estimates supports 
the assessment that economic growth has 
continued into the fourth quarter of this 
year,…” 
“…, the risks surrounding this outlook 
for economic growth lie on the 
downside.” 
“Money and credit have both continued 
to grow vigorously in recent months.” 
“…, even taking these special factors 
into account, the underlying rate of 
monetary expansion remains strong.” 
January 2008 
- 10.1.2008 
- no change 
 
(2,0,1) 
 
 
 
 
 
“Risks to this medium-term outlook for 
price developments are fully confirmed 
to lie on the upside.” 
“This assessment is in line with 
indicators for business and consumer 
confidence which, while declining over 
the past few months, generally remain at 
levels that continue to point to ongoing 
growth.” 
“That said, uncertainty about the 
prospects for economic growth remains 
high and risks surrounding the outlook 
for economic activity lie on the 
downside.” 
“Money and credit have both continued 
to grow vigorously in recent months.” 
“Nonetheless, even taking these special 
factors into account, the underlying rate 
of monetary expansion remains strong.” 
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February 2008 
- 7.2.2008 
- no change 
 
 
 
(2,0,1) 
 
 
“Risks to this medium-term outlook for 
price developments are fully confirmed 
to lie on the upside.” 
“This assessment is in line with 
indicators for business and consumer 
confidence which, while having declined 
over the past few months, overall remain 
consistent with ongoing growth.” 
“That said, uncertainty about the 
prospects for economic growth is 
unusually high and the risks…have been 
confirmed to lie on the downside.” 
“Annual M3 growth, …, remained very 
vigorous at 11.5%...” 
“…, broad-based assessment of the latest 
data confirms that the underlying rate of 
monetary expansion remains strong.” 
March 2008 
- 6.3.2008 
- no change 
 
(1,0,1) 
 
 
 
“…, the risks to the outlook for inflation 
over the medium term are on the upside.” 
“…, the latest information on economic 
activity confirms the picture of 
moderating growth around the turn of the 
year.” 
“Surveys of business and consumer 
confidence, which have followed a 
downward trend since the summer of 
2007, overall remain consistent with 
ongoing growth.” 
“Annual M3 growth remained very 
vigorous at 11.5% in January, …” 
“…, a broad-based assessment of the 
latest data confirms that the underlying 
rate of money and credit growth remains 
strong.” 
April 2008 
- 10.4.2008 
- no change 
 
(1,0,1) 
 
 
“The risks to the outlook for inflation 
over the medium term remain clearly on 
the upside.” 
“Looking ahead, both domestic and 
foreign demand are expected to support 
ongoing real GDP growth in the euro 
area in 2008.” 
“The uncertainty surrounding this 
outlook for economic growth remains 
high, and downside risk prevails.” 
“…, even after taking such effects, a 
broad-based assessment of the latest data 
confirms that the underlying rate of 
money and credit growth remains 
strong.” 
May 2008 
- 8.5.2008 
- no change 
 
(1,0,1) 
 
 
“The risks to the outlook for inflation 
over the medium term remain clearly on 
the upside.” 
“…, the latest data and survey 
information on economic activity 
confirms previous expectations of 
moderate but ongoing growth…” 
“The uncertainty surrounding this 
outlook for economic growth remains 
high, and downside risk prevails.” 
“Annual M3 growth remained very 
vigorous at 10.3% in March, …” 
“…, even after taking such effects into 
account, a broad-based assessment of the 
latest data confirms that the underlying 
rate of money and credit growth remains 
strong.” 
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June 2008 
- 5.6.2008 
- no change 
 
 
(2,0,1) 
 
 
“…, at the policy-relevant medium-term 
horizon risks to outlook for prices remain 
clearly on the upside and have increased 
further.” 
“In line with available forecasts, both 
domestic and foreign demand are 
expected to support ongoing real GDP 
growth in the euro area in 2008.” 
“…, the uncertainty surrounding this 
outlook for economic growth remains 
high, and downside risks prevail.” 
“The monetary analysis confirms the 
prevailing upside risks to price stability 
at medium to longer-term horizons.” 
“…, even after taking such effects into 
account, a broad-based assessment of the 
latest data confirms that the underlying 
rate of money and credit growth remains 
strong.” 
July 2008 
- 3.7.2008 
- raise by 25 basis points to 4.25% 
 
(2,0,1) 
 
 
“Risks to price stability at the policy-
relevant medium-term horizon remain 
clearly on the upside and have increased 
further over the past few months.” 
“Interpreted on this basis, the 
information available remains broadly in 
line with the Governing Council’s 
expectation of moderate ongoing 
growth.” 
“…, the uncertainty…remains high, …, 
and downside risks prevail.” 
“…, annual M3 growth has remained 
very vigorous in recent months,…” 
“…,even after taking such effects into 
account, a broad-based assessment of the 
latest data confirms that the underlying 
rate of money and credit growth remains 
strong.” 
August 2008 
- 7.8.2008 
- no change 
 
(2,0,1) 
 
 
 
“Risks to price stability at the policy-
relevant medium-term horizon remain 
clearly on the upside and have increased 
over the past few months.” 
“…, it also partly reflects a weakening in 
GDP growth due to factors such as 
slower expansion at the global level…” 
“…, the uncertainty…remains high, 
owing to, …, the very high and volatile 
levels of commodity prices and the 
ongoing tension in financial markets. 
Overall, downside risks prevail.” 
“While the growth of broad money and 
credit aggregates is now showing some 
signs of moderation,…” 
“Overall, a broad-based analysis of the 
data, taking the appropriate medium-term 
perspective, confirms the underlying 
strength of money growth.”  
September 2008 
- 4.9.2008 
- no change 
 
(1,-1,0) 
 
 
“…, at the policy-relevant medium-term 
horizon, there are upside risks to the 
outlook for price developments.” 
“There is particularly a very strong 
concern that the emergence of broad-
based second-round effects in price and 
wage-setting behaviour could add 
significantly to inflationary pressures.” 
“Taking into account all available 
information, the euro area is currently 
experiencing an episode of weak 
activity…” 
“…, the uncertainty surrounding this 
outlook for economic activity is 
particularly high at the current juncture 
and, generally, downside risks prevail.” 
“While the growth of broad money and 
credit aggregates is now showing some 
signs of moderation, …, the strong 
underlying pace of monetary expansion 
points to continued upside risks to price 
stability over the medium-term.”  
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October 2008 
- 8.10.2009 
- reduce by 50 basis points to 3.75% 
 
(0,-1,0) 
 
Note: The issue of the Monthly Bulletin 
was finalised before the decision to cut 
the rates. 
“At the policy-relevant medium-term 
horizon, taking into account the 
weakening demand, upside risks to price 
stability have diminished somewhat, but 
they have not disappeared.” 
 
“When analysing current developments 
current developments n economic 
activity, it needs to be stressed that the 
current situation brings with it an 
extraordinarily high degree of 
uncertainty.” 
“…, the economic outlook is subject to 
increased downside risks.” 
“While the still strong underlying pace of 
monetary expansion points to upside 
risks to price stability over the medium 
term, the growth of broad money and 
credit aggregates is showing some further 
signs of moderation.” 
November 2008 
- 6.11.2008 
- reduce by 50 basis points to 3.25% 
 
 
(0,-2,0) 
 
“… current analysis indicate a further 
alleviation of upside risks to price 
stability at the policy-relevant medium-
term horizon, even though they have not 
disappeared completely.” 
 
“…, the latest survey data confirm that 
momentum in economic activity has 
weakened significantly,…, looking 
forward, it will remain crucial to lay 
sound foundations for a recovery.” 
“…, a number of the downside risks to 
economic activity … have materialised.” 
“…, the annual growth rates of broad 
money and credit aggregates, while still 
remaining strong, continued to decline in 
September. Taking the appropriate 
medium-term perspective, monetary data 
up to September confirm that upside 
risks…diminishing but…not disappeared 
completely.” 
December 2008 
- 4.12.2008 
- reduce by 75 basis points to 2.50% 
 
 
(0,-2,0) 
 
 
“…, risks to price stability at the policy-
relevant horizon are more balanced than 
in the past.” 
 
“…an intensified and broadening of the 
financial market turmoil.” 
“…a number of downside risks to 
economic activity…have 
materialised,…” 
“…the significant slowdown in economic 
activity…” 
“While the underlying pace of monetary 
expansion has remained strong, it has 
continued to decelerate further.” 
January 2009 
- 15.1.2009 
- reduce by 50 basis points to 2.00% 
 
 
(0,-2,-0) 
 
“”Risks to price stability over the 
medium term are broadly balanced. 
Unexpected further declines in 
commodity prices of a stronger than 
expected slowdown in the economy 
could put downward pressure…while 
upside risks … could materialise.” 
“…economic activity throughout the 
world , including in the euro area, has 
weakened further.”  
“…, this outlook for the economy 
remains surrounded by an exceptionally 
high degree of uncertainty.” “Overall, 
risks to economic growth remain clearly 
on the downside.” 
“Turning to the monetary analysis, the 
latest evidence confirms a moderating 
rate of monetary expansion in the euro 
area. Monetary trends therefore support 
the view that inflationary pressures and 
risks are diminishing.” 
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February 2009 
- 5.2.2009 
- no change 
 
(0,-2,0) 
 
“Looking over the policy-relevant 
medium-term horizon, annual HICP 
inflation is expected to be in line with 
price stability.” 
“…the outlook for the economy remains 
surrounded by an exceptionally high 
degree of uncertainty. Overall, risks to 
economic growth remain clearly on the 
downside.” 
“…the latest evidence confirms a 
continued deceleration in the underlying 
pace of monetary expansion in the euro 
area, supporting the view that 
inflationary pressures are diminishing.” 
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Appendix 2 
 
Ordered-Probit Estimates of Reaction Function: January 2000 -February 2009 
 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Sentiment 0.0845*** 
(3.24) 
0.0597** 
(2.15) 
0.0918*** 
(3.30) 
   
Expected Growth    1.854*** 
(4.83) 
1.629*** 
(4.71) 
2.008*** 
(4.97) 
Headline Inflation -0.5537 
(-1.96)** 
 
 
 0.281 
(0.90) 
  
Core Inflation  -0.6230 
(-1.26) 
  -0.817 
(-1.55) 
 
Expected Inflation   -0.870 
(-1.43) 
  1.209* 
(1.86) 
M3 Growth -0.102 
(-0.82) 
-0.0236 
(-0.17) 
-0.117 
(-0.95) 
0.442*** 
(4.15) 
0.456*** 
(4.05) 
0.419*** 
(3.82) 
Exchange Rate -7.619*** 
(-2.60) 
-6.777** 
(-2.24) 
-7.119** 
(-2.40) 
-10.293*** 
(3.20) 
-8.367** 
(-2.49) 
-10.669*** 
(-3.26) 
Lagged Change in Repo Rate -0.036 
(-0.12) 
-0.083 
(0.28) 
-0.036 
(-0.12) 
-0.469 
(-1.36 
-0.521 
(-1.49) 
-0.558 
(-1.57) 
Lagged Level of Repo Rate -0.278* 
(-1.65) 
-0.329** 
(-2.01) 
-0.249 
(-1.38) 
-0.867*** 
(-3.80) 
-0.732 
(-3.57) 
-1.063*** 
(-3.98) 
Pseudo-R2 0.2299 0.2150 0.2178 0.3447 0.3557 0.3630 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parantheses.*, **, and *** denote significance at the 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent level, 
respectively. 
